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Introduction
Like many other industrialized nations, the United States has traditionally favored
arbitration for resolution of investment disputes with foreign host states, particularly with
respect to expropriation claims. The past decade, however, has seen a noticeable sea
change in outlook. Congress has enacted trade legislation giving evidence of an intention
to restrict arbitration in investment treaties. And open criticism of investment arbitration
has been voiced by significant elements of the media, as well as advocacy groups that
focus on environmental and regulatory issues.
The cause of this attitude shift is not difficult to find. In 1994 the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) entered into force, 1 bringing with it an adjudicatory
regime that gives investors the right to require arbitration of disputes arising out of
investments in another member country, in connection with matters such as
expropriation, discrimination and unfair treatment. The United States and Canada each
became respondents pursuant to claims brought by investors from the other country. 2
The result was an awareness of the down-side of arbitration, including the
prospect that key economic and political matters would be decided in confidential

1

North American Free Trade Agreement, 32 I.L.M. 289, 1993 WL 574441. NAFTA
was enacted in the U.S. on 8 December 1993, 107 Stat. 2057.
2

Thus far Mexico seems to have been principally on the receiving end of investment
claims. The one well-known arbitration that Mexico did initiate against the United States
(In the Matter of Cross-Border Trucking Services) was brought under the provisions of
NAFTA Chapter 20, relating to state-to-state arbitration, rather than the Chapter 11
mechanism (discussed infra) for claims brought by private investors. See Final Report,
NAFTA Panel Established Pursuant to Chapter Twenty in the Matter of Cross-Border
Trucking Services (Secretariat File No. USA-MEX-98-2008-01), 6 February 2001.

2
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proceedings by a tribunal consisting in majority of foreigners. In the United States,
however, the new face of investment arbitration caused a shiver of apprehension. Media
attacks and legislative initiatives were launched with the aim of hobbling the neutral
adjudicatory process which for years had served to underpin investor confidence in the
protection of investments abroad.
This Article suggests that arbitration under investment treaties such as NAFTA
will enhance the type of asset protection that facilitates wealth-creating cross-border
capital flows, bringing net gains for both host state and foreign investor. While there
may be benefits from minor tinkering with this investment protection regime, general
attacks on investment arbitration are likely to backfire, creating for all countries involved
more problems than they solve.
I.

The Contours of Investment Arbitration
A. Historical Context
NAFTA brings investment arbitration full circle, to a time more than two

centuries ago when the United States was principally a debtor nation. In 1794 the socalled “Jay Treaty” (named for its American negotiator John Jay, later Chief Justice of
the U.S. Supreme Court) gave British creditors the right to arbitrate claims of alleged
despoliation by American citizens and residents. 3

3

Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, London, 19 November 1794, U.S.-U.K., 8
Stat. 116. The treaty addressed difficulties arising from the 1783 Treaty of Paris ending
the American Revolution. Under Article 6, damages for British creditors were to be
determined by five Commissioners. Two were appointed by the British and two by the
United States, with the fifth chosen unanimously by the others, in default of which
selection would be by lot from between two candidates, one proposed by each side. For
an intriguing comparison of modern investment arbitration and the Jay Treaty, see Barton
Legum, Federalism, NAFTA Chapter Eleven and the Jay Treaty of 1794, 18 ICSID News
(Spring 2001) (Remarks presented at panel discussion on “Investment Disputes and
3

More recently, however, it was African and Latin American nations that were
required by multinational corporations to submit investment disputes to arbitration, either
through arbitration clauses contained in custom-tailored concession agreements or
through bilateral and multilateral investment treaties. 4 Such arbitration has often
implicated natural resources and elements of industrial infrastructure no less critical to
the economic sovereignty and well-being of those countries than the NAFTA cases that
have caused controversy in the United States and Canada.
During the late 19th and early 20th century, developing countries often perceived
investment arbitration as little more than an extension of gunboat diplomacy. Investor
nations were seen to control the arbitral process in a way that permitted it to be used
simply as a tool for extracting concessions from the host country. In state-to-state
proceedings, private investors participated only vicariously through their governments.
Latin American states were often forced to submit disputes to European sovereigns such
as Britain’s Queen Victoria, Russia’s Tsar Alexander II, Germany’s Kaiser Wilhelm II

NAFTA Chapter 11” at 95th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International
Law, Washington, D.C., 4-7 April 2001. . The best known of these arbitrations was the
Alabama Claims case. In 1872 an arbitral tribunal composed of five arbitrators
(American, British, Italian, Swiss and Brazilian) awarded more than $ 15 million dollars
to the United States for damages caused by Britain’s violation of the laws of war in
allowing its nationals to build warships in British ports for the Southern Confederacy
during the American Civil War. Alabama Claims Case, Decision and Award (14 Sept.
1872), reprinted in THOMAS WILLING BALCH, THE ALABAMA ARBITRATION 131 app.
(1900) See generally, J. L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 285-288 (1963)
4

Treaty-based arbitration might take place under the auspices of the World Bank’s
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (discussed infra) or one of
the many Bilateral Investment Treaties. See generally RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE
STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES (1995); Eloïse Obadia, ICSID, Investment
Treaties and Arbitration: Current and Emerging Issues, 18 NEWS FROM ICSID 14
(Autumn 2001); Matthew Cobb, Development of Arbitration in Foreign Investment, 16
INT’L ARB. REP. 48 (April 2001); Kazutake Okuma, Investment Disputes Settlement, 34
SEINAN LAW REVIEW 75 (2002).
4

and King Léopold I of Belgium, whose predispositions and sympathies did not always
inspire confidence among developing countries. 5
Not surprisingly, host states reacted to what they perceived as foreign control of
their economies. Invoking principles articulated by the 19th century Argentine jurist
Carlos Calvo, Latin American countries came to require similar treatment for foreign and
domestic investors. 6 This effectively eliminated as options both diplomatic protection 7
and arbitration. In 1974 the Calvo doctrine was pushed further in the so-called “New
International Economic Order” adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in an
attempt (unsuccessful as history has shown 8) to require host state courts rather than
international arbitrators to determine the measure of compensation for expropriated
property. 9

5

See survey in Lionel M. Summers, Arbitration and Latin America, 3 CAL. W. L. J. 1
(2001), at 6-7.
6

Calvo first announced his doctrine in 1868, in LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL THÉORIQUE ET
PRATIQUE. The principle that foreign nations should not intervene in South America to
protect private property and debts included several elements: investor submission to
local jurisdiction and local law, waiver of home state protection and surrender of rights
under customary public international law. See generally, Kurt Lipstein, The Place of the
Calvo Clause in International Law, 1945 BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
130 (concluding at 145 that “before international tribunals the Calvo Clause is
ineffective”).
7

See discussion supra at --.

8

Thomas Waelde, Requiem for New International Order, in LIBER AMICORUM FOR I.
SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN 771 (G. Hafner et al. eds. 1998).
9

Charter of Rights and Duties of States, Article 2(2)(c), provides that compensation
should be “appropriate” as determined under “the domestic law of the nationalizing State
and by its tribunals.” See William W. Park, Legal Issues in the Third World's Economic
Development, 61 B. U. L. REV. 1321 (1981). This principle was rejected in Texaco
Overseas Petroleum Co. (TOPCO)/California Asiatic Oil Co. (CALASIATIC) v. Libya, 17
I.L.M. 1 (1978). See also Libyan American Oil Co (LIAMCO) v. Libya, 482 F. Supp.
1175 (D.D.C. 1980), vac’d without op., 684 F.2d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
5

Ultimately an increasing number of capital importing countries came to realize
that their self-interest was served by agreeing to arbitrate investment disputes. Equally as
significant, arbitration became a fairer process. Representatives from developing
countries began to participate more actively in international arbitral institutions such as
the ICC, ICSID and the LCIA, as well as in the formulation of new procedural rules such
as those of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). 10
Developing countries also came to realize that the greater the risk, the higher the
cost of investment. Untrustworthy enforcement mechanisms tend to chill cross-border
economic cooperation to the detriment of those countries that depend most on foreign
capital for development. To the extent that arbitration promotes respect for implicit
bargains between investor and host country, it came to commend itself to developing
countries as a matter of sound international economic policy.
B. Double Standards
To some observers a double standard toward investment arbitration seems to be
creeping into American attitudes toward investment arbitration. 11 Arbitration is good

10

See Chapter 36, W. LAURENCE CRAIG, WILLIAM W. PARK & JAN PAULSSON,
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION 661-678) (3d Ed., 2000). On the
working of UNCITRAL, see HOWARD HOLTZMANN & JOSEPH E. NEUHAUS, A GUIDE TO
THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 4-6
(1989).
11

Some may be reminded of the Jules Romains character who liked honesty “but only in
others.” The French novelist described a foreign emissary who helped himself to a share
of the bribes his government paid newspapers, but was shocked that intermediaries had
skimmed from these payments. Romains writes, “M. Choubersky, lequel sans doute se
charge de prélever sur ces millions une gorgée abondante, semble trouver mauvais que
les intermédiaires aient une soif parente de la sienne. C’est un homme qui aime
l’honnêteté d’autrui.” (“Mr. Choubersky, who doubtlessly undertook to deduct from
these millions a large mouthful for himself, seemed to take it ill that the intermediaries
had a thirst equal to his own. He is a man who likes honesty in others. ”) JULES
6

when it corrects misbehavior by foreign host states, but not so desirable when claims are
filed for alleged wrongdoing by the United States. Many business and political leaders
still support arbitration as the preferred method to resolve disputes between host countries
and foreign investors. However, recent trade legislation has significantly impaired the
vigor of future treaty-based arbitration of investment disputes, with the United States
pursuing a course and a tone quite different from when negotiating NAFTA. 12 Moreover,
vocal opposition to investment arbitration has been expressed by important segments of
the media and several non-governmental organizations.
Traditionally, American multinationals imposed arbitration as the mechanism for
settling investment disputes with foreign countries, particularly in Latin America.
Arbitration was justified as a way to level the playing field and to reduce the prospect of
host state “home town justice,” thereby safeguarding assets from expropriation without
compensation. Foreign investment was seen as a net good for both investor and host
state, helping to reduce poverty through international economic cooperation. And
arbitration was perceived as one way to promote respect for the rule of law underpinning
investment stability.
The argument ran as follows. No supranational courts possess mandatory
jurisdiction to decide the appropriate indemnity for nationalized assets. 13 Absent

ROMAINS, LES HOMMES DE BONNE VOLONTE (1958), Part 9 (Montée des Périls) Section
XXX (Réponse de Marc Strigelius) (Robert Laffont Edition, 1988, Volume II, at 335).
12

See discussion infra of Trade Act of 2002. See also Edward Allen, “Washington
Alters Line on US Investor Protection,” Financial Times, 2 October 2002, at 13,
describing how the United States in its bilateral trade negotiations with Chile and
Singapore has attempted to limit the legal recourse available to investors who believe
their property has been expropriated without compensation by foreign host states.

The experience of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) is limited both by tradition
and by jurisdictional constraints. For one commercial case that did reach the ICJ, see
13

7

assertions of diplomatic protection, 14 litigation in the expropriating country remains the
default mechanism for adjudicating investment disputes. 15 Consequently, the real or
imagined bias of host country judges can create an anxiety that inhibits wealth-creating
transactions and discourages cross-border economic cooperation, 16 and will inevitably
either thwart cross-border economic cooperation or add to its cost. 17
Arbitration responds to this apprehension by providing a forum that is more
neutral than host country courts, both politically and procedurally. The relative
impartiality of international tribunals bolsters investor confidence and inspires greater
certainty that the contract will be interpreted in line with the parties’ shared ex ante
expectations.

Elettronica Sicula SPA (ELSI) (United States v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (1989) (finding no
illegal taking of property when Italy requisitioned plant and equipment owned by US
nationals in order to prevent planned liquidation).
14

Diplomatic protection involves state-to-state claims in which a foreign investor
invokes his country’s intervention against the host state. Traditional perspectives on
diplomatic protection are discussed in J. L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 285-288
(1963); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 465-95 (2d ed.
1972).
In most cases one would expect investors to prefer arbitration to the more cumbersome
process of having their country assert diplomatic protection. Exceptions might arise
when the legal basis of the claim was weak and the investor state had a degree of clout
with the host country.
15

The perception of litigation bias may be as significant as its reality. A study of US
federal civil actions between 1986 and 1994 found that foreigners actually fared better
than domestic parties. See Kevin Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in
American Courts, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1122, 1133–34 (1996). One explanation for this
finding lies in a fear of judicial and jury partiality that leads foreign litigants to settle
rather than continue to final judgment unless their cases are particularly strong.
16

17

To illustrate, imagine an attractive investment abroad in Country X where there is
doubt that local courts will be fair to a foreign party, and another efficient opportunity in
the investor’s home country. Depending on the size of the disparity between the
expected returns, many risk-averse merchants will choose the lower return coupled with
the fairer legal system. See generally William W. Park, Neutrality, Predictability and
Economic Cooperation, 12 (No. 4) J. INT'L ARB. 99 (1995).
8

When NAFTA came into force, however, the rifle sights were turned in the
opposite direction, and the United States and Canada became respondents in cases
brought by investors based in other NAFTA countries. 18 After claims for unfair
treatment were filed against the United States government, arbitration looked different
than when American companies were the investors. 19 This was a new experience, since
NAFTA represented the first time two of the so-called “G-7” industrialized countries 20
entered into mandatory arbitration arrangements with each other. 21
Interestingly, role reversal for the United States and Canada occurred not because
investors from Mexico (a traditional host state) began bringing claims against its northern
neighbors. Rather, it was Canada and the United States that began attacking each other,
with claims by Canadian investors against the American government, and claims by
American investors against Canada. 22

18

NAFTA Chapter 11 protects “investors of another Party” (Article 1101), defined in
Article 1139 to include “a national or an enterprise of such Party.” See also general
definitions of Article 201, including as an “enterprise of a Party” an enterprise
“constituted or organized under the law of a Party.”
19

See Charles Brower & Lee Steven, Who Then Should Judge?: Developing the
International Rule of Law under NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 93 (2001);
Charles H. Brower, II, Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: A Tale of Fear and
Equilibrium, 29 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 43 (2001); Charles H. Brower, II, Structure,
Legitimacy and NAFTA’s Investment Chapter, 36 VANDERBILT J. TRANSN’L L. 37 (2003).
20

Beginning in 1986, the finance ministers and central bank governors of seven major
industrialized countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy Japan, the United States and the
United Kingdom) began meeting in order to improve communication and cooperation on
matters related to economic and financial growth, inflation and currency developments.
In 1997 the summit became known as the G-8 to reflect Russia's participation,
particularly in discussions on ways to combat the financing of terrorism.
21

Prior to NAFTA, investment arbitration implicated claims by nationals of
industrialized countries against developing nations pursuant to bilateral investment
treaties. Although the treaty obligations flowed both ways, the investment did not.
22

See discussion infra.
9

As Americans and Canadians began to understand the host state perspective,
praise for arbitration’s neutrality began to have competition in the form of complaints
about infringement of national sovereignty and democracy. The level playing field no
longer appeared as an unalloyed benefit. Environmental and consumer groups, as well as
the media and Congress, began taking the position that NAFTA undermined legitimate
governmental regulations, challenged legislative prerogatives and opened decisionmaking to ill-informed foreign tribunals. 23
The NAFTA process was attacked for the confidentiality of its proceedings (“lack
of transparency”), uncertainty and absence of accountability to domestic constituents. A
dispute resolution process that had been fair for the rest of the world came to be seen as a
tool to put business before public interest.
In the present climate of public opinion, many Americans and Canadians fail to
understand why arbitration should be available for foreign investors. Taking for granted
the fairness of their own judicial systems, Americans in particular are often surprised that
not everyone feels comfortable with civil juries and the prospect of large punitive
damages. 24

23

See discussion infra.

24

For evidence of foreign fear of litigation bias in American courts, see discussion infra
of the Loewen case and findings reported in Kevin Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg,
discussed supra. American commentators have also expressed doubts and concerns
about civil juries and punitive damages. See, e.g., Robert A. Klinck, The Punitive
Damage Debate, 38 HARV. J. LEGIS. 469 (2001); Theodore Eisenberg, Neil LaFountain,
Brian Ostrom, David Rottman & Martin T. Wells, Juries, Judges and Punitive Damages:
An Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2003); David A. Schkade, Erratic by
Design: A Task Analysis of Punitive Damages Assessment, 39 HARV. J. LEGIS. 121
(2002); Stephen J. Ware, Consumer and Employment Arbitration Law in Comparative
Perspective: The Importance of the Civil Jury, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 865 (2002); Richard
W. Murphy, Punitive Damages, Explanatory Verdicts and the Hard Look, 76 WASH. L.
REV. 995 (2001); Lisa Litwiller, Has the Supreme Court Sounded the Death Knell for
10

Regardless of whether such self-perceptions are valid, the fact remains that when
NAFTA was being negotiated, it was the United States that insisted on arbitration as a
protection for foreign investment. The business community’s longstanding hesitation
toward foreign litigation made it vital to bolster confidence that investors would receive a
“fair shake” in the event of controversy with the host government.
NAFTA also stipulated substantive standards of investor protection that would
require interpretation. Reciprocal lack of trust among the three countries made it unlikely
that host state courts would be acceptable to construe and apply these standards.
Understandably, this investor protection scheme was based upon equality of
treatment among the three countries. For Mexico to accept arbitration of investment
disputes within its borders, Canada and the United States had to respect a similar dispute
resolution process. It would have been unwise and unworkable for Chapter 11 to be
applied by American and Canadian courts when claims were brought against the United
States and Canada, but to have arbitrators appointed for claims against Mexico.

Jury Assessed Punitive Damages? A Critical Re-Examination of the American Jury,
36 U.S.F.L. REV. 411 (2002); W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Jurors Fail to
Promote Efficiency, 39 HARV. J. LEGIS. 139 (2002); John J. Kircher, Punitive Damages
and Business Organizations: A Pathetic Fallacy, 67 Tenn. Rev. 971 (2000); Perry E.
Casazza, Nevada’s Mastrobuono: How the 2001 Legislature Threw Another Wrench into
the Punitive Damages Machines of Arbitration Law, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 189 (2002);
Michelle L. Hartmann, Is It a Short Trip Back to Manor Farm? A Study of Judicial
Attitudes and Behaviors Concerning the Civil Jury System, 54 S.M.U.L. REV. 1827
(2001); Valerie P. Hans, U.S. Jury Reform: The Active Jury and the Adversarial Ideal,
21 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 85 (2002); Valerie P. Hans, The Illusions and Realities of
Jurors’ Treatment of Corporate Defendants, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 327 (1998).
11

II.

NAFTA Chapter 11
A. Safeguarding Cross-Border Investment 25
NAFTA Chapter 11 gives business managers from a member country the

opportunity to arbitrate investment grievances with the government of another NAFTA
country, regardless of whether an agreement to arbitrate actually exists in a negotiated
investment concession. 26 This private right to direct action eliminates recourse to
traditional state-to-state negotiations, in which a foreign investor asks for his country’s
intervention against the host state.
The first part of Chapter 11 (Section A) imposes the substantive norms for crossborder investment, forbidding discrimination against investors from another member
country, 27 and requiring “fair and equitable” treatment as well as compensation for
25

See generally Henri C. Alvarez, Arbitration Under the North American Free Trade
Agreement, 16 ARB. INT’L 393 (2000); Axelle Lemaire, Le Nouveau visage de l’arbitrage
entre état et investisseur étranger: le chapitre 11 de l’ALENA, 2001 REV. ARB. 43; Todd
Weiler, Substantive Law Developments in NAFTA Arbitration, 16 INT’L ARB. REP. 69
(December 2001); Leon Trakman, Arbitrating Investment Disputes Under NAFTA, 18(4)
J. INT’L ARB. 385 (2001); William S. Dodge, National Courts and International
Arbitration: Exhaustion of Remedies and Res Judicata Under Chapter Eleven of NAFTA,
23 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 357 (2000); Patrick Dumberry, The NAFTA
Investment Dispute Settlement Mechanism: A Review of the Latest Case Law, 2 J. WORLD
INVESTMENT 151 (2001); Todd Weiler, NAFTA Investment Arbitration and the Growth of
International Economic Law, 36 CANADIAN BUS. L. J. 405 (2002); Chris Tollefson,
Games Without Frontiers: Investor Claims and Citizen Submissions Under the NAFTA
Regime, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 141 (2002).
26

See generally Todd Weiler, The Ethyl Arbitration: First of Its Kind and a Harbinger
of Things to Come, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 187 (2000).
27

Each member country must treat NAFTA investors and their investments no less
favorably that its own investors (Article 1102, concerning National Treatment) and
investors of other countries (Article 1103, concerning Most-Favored-Nation Treatment).
In S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada a Partial Award of 13 November 2000
articulated the national treatment standard to require consideration as to whether the
NAFTA investor is in the same “economic and business sector” as the national investor.
A measure breaches the national treatment standard if (i) it creates a disproportionate
benefit for nationals over non-nationals, (ii) the measure, on its face, appears to favor
12

nationalized property. 28 An entity incorporated and with substantial business activities 29
in a NAFTA country qualifies as an investor without regard to any “origin of capital”
limitations. 30 Thus a Mexican corporation owned by French shareholders qualifies as an
investor under NAFTA Chapter 11.
The compensation criteria adopted by NAFTA Chapter 11 were intended to be
compatible with standards traditionally advocated by the United States. 31 Expropriation

nationals over non-nationals and (iii) there must be a practical impact required, not
merely motive or intent. Political subdivisions must provide foreign investors no less
favorable treatment than the best treatment accorded to investors of the country to which
the subdivision belongs. For example, Massachusetts must treat investors from Québec
no less favorably than it treats investors from New York or Pennsylvania.
28

Article 1102 prohibits discrimination by requiring “national treatment,” while Article
1105 requires respect for international law, including “fair and equitable treatment” as a
minimum standard. Proper compensation for nationalized property is mandated by
Article 1110.
29

See article 1113(2).

30

See definitions in Articles 201 and 1139. Moreover, standing to bring a claim may be
based on citizenship regardless of residence. See interim award in Feldman (a.k.a.
Karpa) v. United Mexican States, 40 I.L.M. 615 (2001), which determined inter alia that
permanent residence in Mexico did not deprive a US citizen of the right to arbitrate
claims concerning tobacco export tax rebates.
While the terms “prompt, adequate and effective” do not appear in the text of Chapter
11, some observers consider the combination of Article 1110 factors (“paid without
delay,” “fair market value” and “fully realizable”) to amount to the same result. See
Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law § 712, comments c and d, and Reporter’s
note 2 (1987) stating that for compensation to be “just” it must be “paid at the time of
taking,” “in an amount equivalent to the value of the property taken” and “in a form
economically usable by the foreign national.” The expression “prompt, adequate and
effective” originates in a communication to Mexico from US Secretary of State Cordell
Hull on 22 August 1938. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658
F.2d 875, 888 (2d Cir. 1981). Compare the standard under Restatement § 712 with the
United Nations’ Charter of Rights and Duties of States Art 2(2)(c), providing that
compensation should be “appropriate” as determined under “the domestic law of the
nationalizing State and by its tribunals.” See William W. Park, Legal Issues in the Third
World’s Economic Development, 61 B.U. L. REV. 1321 (1981).
31

13

must be justified by a public purpose and applied on a non-discriminatory basis. 32
Compensation must be “equivalent to the fair market value” of the investment at the date
of expropriation, must be “paid without delay and be fully realizable,” and must bear
interest at a commercially reasonable rate until the date of actual payment. If paid other
than in a hard currency, 33 compensation must be in an amount which, at market rates of
exchange, would convert into a sum no less than the hard currency equivalent of market
value on the payment date. Compensation will not be affected because market awareness
of the pending expropriation drove down the property’s price. 34
The second portion of Chapter 11 (Section B) goes on to provide arbitration as a
remedy for a host state’s breach of its duties. An aggrieved investor 35 may choose either
(i) arbitration supervised by the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (“ICSID”) (part of the World Bank group), 36 or (ii) a proceeding conducted

NAFTA Article 1110(1) adopts a four-part structure, requiring that the expropriation
(1) have a public purpose, (2) be applied on a non-discriminatory basis, (3) “in
accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1)” [“fair and equitable treatment”]
and (4) result in “payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 through 6
[of Article 1110],” which adopt the fair market value standard.
32

NAFTA Article 1110 speaks of a “G-7 currency,” which includes the currencies of
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
32 I.L.M. at 641. For France, Germany, and Italy, members of the European Union’s
common currency union, the currency would now be the Euro. By contrast, the United
Kingdom at present maintains its own currency.

33

NAFTA Article 1110(2) provides that fair market value “shall not reflect any change
in value occurring because the intended expropriation had become known earlier.”
34

Claims may be made either directly or on behalf of an enterprise owned by the investor
under NAFTA Article 1116.

35

Established under the 1965 Washington Convention (“Convention”), ICSID normally
has jurisdiction over investment disputes between a state that is a party to the Convention
and an investor from another Convention State. The Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, 18 March 1965,
entered into force 14 October 1966. See generally RUDOLF DOLZER AND MARGRETE
STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 130-46 (1995); Abby Cohen Smutny,
36

14

under arbitration rules adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (“UNCITRAL”). 37 Disputes raising common questions of fact or law may be
consolidated into a single arbitration. 38
Should the investor want ICSID arbitration there is a slight limitation. Neither
Mexico nor Canada is yet party to the Washington Convention establishing ICSID.
Consequently ICSID-style arbitration must proceed under the so-called ICSID Additional
Facility designed for cases in which the Washington Convention does not apply. As
discussed below, this will have significant consequences when one side wishes to mount
a challenge to the arbitration.
B. The Role of the Arbitral Situs
1. Current Alternatives
When a dissatisfied loser in NAFTA arbitration seeks to have an award set aside,
the choice of arbitral forum may have a significant impact on the role played by courts at
the arbitral situs. 39 To understand the impact of local law, a brief contrast might be
helpful. Under “pure” ICSID arbitration, the Washington Convention forecloses

Arbitration Before the International Centre for Investment Disputes, 3 BUSINESS LAW
INT’L 367 (September 2002).
NAFTA Article 1120. Unless otherwise agreed, the place of arbitration must be in the
territory of a country that is a party to both NAFTA and the New York Arbitration
Convention. See NAFTA Article 1130, referring to a “Party [a NAFTA member] that is
a party to the New York Convention.”
37

38

Article 1126.

39

See generally David Williams, Challenging Investment Treaaty Arbitration Awards:
Issues Concerning the Forum, presented at ICCA Congress XVI (London, 15 May 2002).
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challenge to awards on normal statutory grounds 40 in favor of ICSID’s special system of
quality control under its own internal challenge procedure. 41
However, since Canada and Mexico are not parties to the Washington
Convention, investors currently have only two options for arbitral procedure: (i) the
United Nations’ UNCITRAL Rules, which is entirely ad hoc, and (ii) the ICSID
Additional Facility, supervised by ICSID but outside its treaty framework.
Whether under the UNCITRAL or Additional Facility Rules, arbitration will go
forward within the framework of either the New York Convention 42 or the Panama
Convention, 43 both of which require deference to valid arbitration agreements and awards
but say nothing about proper or improper annulment standards. 44 In contrast to ICSID,

For ICSID arbitration in the United States, this rule has never been tested in a court
action raising the conflict between the Federal Arbitration Act (allowing motions to
vacate awards) and the Washington Convention (which excludes such vacatur). The US
Constitution in Article VI (2) lists both treaties and federal statutes as the “supreme Law
of the Land,” without establishing a hierarchy. On some matters statutes clearly override
treaties. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 96-499 § 1125, providing that no treaty shall require
“exemption from (or reduction of) any tax imposed” on gains from disposition of US
realty. When Congress is silent courts look to canons of statutory interpretation such as
“last in time prevails” or “specific restricts general.” See Detlev Vagts, The United States
and its Treaties: Observance and Breach, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 313 (2001).
40

See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States Article 52, ICSID Basic Documents 25 (1985). See generally
W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION AND
ARBITRATION 46–50 (Duke 1992).
41

42

Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 330
U.N.T.S. 38, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997 (1958).
43

Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of 1975, set forth
in 9 U.S.C. Chapter III.
44

At present the United States and Mexico, but not Canada, are parties to the Panama
Convention. In the United States, when both Conventions are applicable, the Panama
Convention prevails. See 9 U.S.C. § 305. While similar in their basic structure, the New
York and Panama Conventions differ in significant respects. For example, the Panama
Convention does not require judges to refer parties to arbitration, or set forth conditions
that must be satisfied by the party seeking award enforcement. Moreover, only the
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the New York and Panama Conventions leave each country free to establish its own
grounds for vacating awards made within its territory.
The consequence of arbitration under the rules of UNCITRAL or the Additional
Facility is that NAFTA awards are now subject to the judicial review mechanisms that
exist at the place of arbitration. 45 NAFTA Article 1136(3)(b) explicitly contemplates
such review. Award enforcement for arbitration under “Additional Facility” or
UNCITRAL rules may not be sought until a court either dismisses or allows an
application to revise, set aside, or annul the award and there is no further appeal, or three
months have elapsed without such application being made.
2. Metalclad
The much-discussed Metalclad case 46 illustrates the role currently given to the
arbitral situs, by which judicial scrutiny of awards varies in function of the monitoring

Panama Convention contains reference to arbitration rules (those of the Inter-American
Commercial Arbitration Commission) that apply in default of party choice. See generally
Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Convention 1958 and Panama Convention 1975:
Redundancy or Compatibility?, 4 ARB. INT’L 229 (1989); John Bowman, The Panama
Convention and Its Implementation under the Federal Arbitration Act, 11 AM. REV. INT’L
ARB. 116 (2000).
In the United States award “finality” has been interpreted to mean final as allowed
under relevant arbitration laws. See, for example, M&C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH &
Co., KG, 87 F.3d 844, 847 (6th Cir. 1996); Iran Aircraft Industries v. Avco Corp., 980
F.2d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1992). Compare the situation in Ontario. In Noble China Inc. v.
Lei, 42 Ont. Rep. (3d) 69, 87 (1998) the UNCITRAL Model Law exclusion of judicial
review was deemed to foreclose a motion to set aside an award, although the court noted
that evidence of bias might have led to a different result. The authors are not aware of
any analogous interpretations of award “finality” in Mexico, which adopted the
UNCITRAL Model Law in June 1993.
45

46

See Metalclad v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award of
30 August 2000, reprinted in 16 INT’L ARB. REP. 62 (January 2001), finding
expropriation without adequate compensation where a U.S.-owned company was
prevented by a Mexican municipality from operating a hazardous waste facility in
Mexico. See Clyde Pearce & Jack Coe, Arbitration under NAFTA Chapter 11—Some
Pragmatic Reflections Upon the First Case Filed Against Mexico, 23 HASTINGS INT’L &
17

standards deemed appropriate by the relevant court. An “Additional Facility” award had
granted damages to an American company for expropriation of a hazardous waste
disposal facility. Regulatory action by a Mexican municipality had prevented a subsidiary
of a US company from operating. Arbitrators had found that Mexican regulatory action
denied “fair and equitable treatment” and constituted expropriation without adequate
compensation. Mexico then petitioned to have the award set aside by the British
Columbia Supreme Court, which had jurisdiction by virtue of the arbitration’s official
situs fixed in Vancouver. 47
As a preliminary matter the court had to decide between application of two
different provincial arbitration statutes. The International Commercial Arbitration Act
(based on the UNCITRAL Model Law) provides a relatively narrow scope of review,
while the Commercial Arbitration Act (which catches arbitration excluded from the
International Act) allows a more generous role for court intervention, including appeal on
points of law.
Surprisingly, the choice turned on the meaning of “commercial” rather than
“international.” The International Act requires that the arbitration be commercial as well
as international. Mexico argued against application of the International Act on the
ground that the arbitration related to a regulatory rather than commercial relationship.

COMP. L. REV. 311 (2001); Todd Weiler, Metalclad v. Mexico: A Play in Three Parts, 2
J. WORLD INVESTMENT 685 (2001). For the British Columbia decision on vacatur, see
United Mexican States v. Metalclad, Vancouver Court Registry Case No. L 002904, Mr.
Justice Tysoe, decided 2 May 2001, reprinted in 16 INT’L ARB. REP. A-1 (May 2001).
47

For convenience, hearings had been held in Washington D.C.
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The court disagreed, finding that the arbitration was commercial in the sense that
it “arose out of a relationship of investing.” 48 Characterizing the arbitration by reference
to the underlying transaction (a cross-border investment) placed the dispute within the
terms of the International Act, which meant that court scrutiny focused on whether the
award exceeded the arbitrators’ powers or violated public policy.
As to the substance of the challenge, the Canadian court found that some but not
all of the arbitrators’ findings exceeded their jurisdiction. In particular, the court held
that the tribunal went beyond its authority in finding that Mexico breached a NAFTA
requirement of “transparency” in the sense that investment requirements should be
knowable and free from doubt. In finding a transparency requirement, the arbitral
tribunal “did not simply interpret the wording of Article 1105 [but] misstated the
applicable law ... and then made its decision on [that] basis.” 49 Nevertheless, the court
upheld the bulk of the award, given that one prong of the arbitrators’ reasoning fell within
their jurisdiction. 50 Consequently, only a portion of the award (dealing with interest) was
set aside and remitted for recalculation. 51

48

See British Columbia Slip Opinion at para. 44.

49

Id., para. 70. This aspect of the case presents an example of how the line between
excess of jurisdiction and simple error of law is often quite thin. The concept of
transparency had been defined earlier in the decision at para. 28.
50

The court agreed that the arbitrators were correct in resting their decision on an
“ecological decree” as tantamount to expropriation. Thus excess of authority was
deemed to exist in only two out of the three breaches of NAFTA found by the arbitrators.
51

This decision has caused some scholars to argue in favor of a supra-national appellate
mechanism to replace review of awards by national courts. See Jack J. Coe, Jr., Domestic
Court Control of Investment Awards -- Necessary Evil or Achilles Heel within NAFTA
and the Proposed FTAA, 19 J. INT’L ARB. 185 (2002); William S. Dodge, Metalclad
Corp. v. Mexico, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 910 (2001), at 918.
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The practical lesson to be learned from Metalclad is that courts at the place of
arbitration will have the last word in an arbitration. Consequently, care should be taken
in selecting a venue where judges exercise a control function over the arbitration’s basic
procedural integrity (looking at matters such as bias, excess of authority and due
process), but do not second guess the arbitrator on the substantive merits of the dispute. 52
From the American perspective, the decision in Metalclad seemed quite normal.
An investor from the United States was found to have been treated unfairly by a political
subdivision of Mexico. Thus the proper way to resolve the dispute was the relatively
neutral mechanism of arbitration rather than Mexican courts. As discussed below,
however, 53 when the shoe is on the other foot perceptions of fairness may be quite
different.
C. Investor Protection in Practice
Considerable grist for the arbitration mill has been supplied by two particular
aspects of Chapter 11: the matters of (i) “minimum standard of treatment” and
(ii) compensation standards for expropriation. Several recent cases illustrate the way
NAFTA has been applied in practice in these areas.
1. Minimum Standards of Treatment
NAFTA Article 1105 (1) requires each country to “accord to investments of
investors of another Party treatment in accordance with international law, including fair
and equitable treatment and full protection and security.” Although the meaning of

See William W. Park, Duty and Discretion in International Arbitration, 93 AM. J. INT’L
L. 805 (1999).
52

53

See discussion infra.
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“international law” has been the object of controversy,

54

at least two conclusions seem

warranted. First, the “fair and equitable standard” has not been met simply by an
extension of national or most favored nation treatment to NAFTA investors. Second,
reference to “full protection and security” adopts the settled principle that a nation is
liable for failure to exercise due diligence to prevent injuries to an investor caused by
third parties. 55
In Metalclad 56 Mexico was held to be in breach of Article 1105(1) as a result of a
lack of “orderly process” and “timely disposition” in relation to a NAFTA investor acting
under the expectation that it would be treated fairly and justly in accordance with
NAFTA. In S.D. Myers 57 treatment of NAFTA investors was held to fall below this
minimum standard of treatment even in a situation where government conduct was not
discriminatory. A breach of Article 1105(1) thus occurs when the NAFTA investor is
treated in such an unjust or arbitrary manner as to rise to a level unacceptable from the
international perspective.
It is worth noting that several aspects of what might loosely be considered fair
treatment are the subject of separate NAFTA provisions. For example, under Article
1106 a NAFTA country may not “impose or enforce ‘performance requirements’ in

54

See discussion of Free Trade Commission Notes of Interpretation, infra.

55

IAN BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE RESPONSIBILITY (1983) at
161; ICSID Case ARB/87/3.
56

Metalclad Corporation v. Government of the United Mexican States, Award of
25 August 2000, discussed supra.
57

S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Partial Award of 13 November 2000,
reprinted in 40 I.L.M. 1408 (2001). U.S. investor hoped to capture a large portion of the
Canadian market for destruction of PCBs by sending materials to Ohio facilities, a
competitive advantage over Canadian facilities further away. Canadian environmental
21

connection with investments in its territory,” which include achievement of export levels,
domestic procurement requirements, minimum local content, trade balancing, product
mandating or the transfer of technology. 58 NAFTA also grants investors an explicit right
to choose senior managers (Article 1107) and the right to convert local currency into
foreign currency at the prevailing market rate of exchange, in order to repatriate earnings,
proceeds of a sale, loan repayments or other investment-related transactions (Article
1109).
2. Expropriation
NAFTA Article 1110 extends protection against un-compensated expropriation to
measures “tantamount to nationalization or expropriation,” thus encompassing takings
that have often been referred to as “creeping” expropriation. 59 In all cases compensation
for expropriation must be paid without delay, be equal to the fair market value of the
investment prior to the expropriation, include interest, and be fully realizable and freely
transferable.
While “tantamount to expropriation” is not defined in NAFTA, this wellestablished concept has been applied to cover not only openly avowed state takings of
property, but also “other actions that have the effect of ‘taking’ the property, in whole or

authorities responded to Canadian lobbying with an emergency ban preventing export of
PCB waste.
58

In two early cases testing this requirement, arbitral tribunals hearing claims against
Canada have failed to find improper imposition of performance requirements. See Pope
& Talbot, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Interim Award on Merits of 26 June 2000; final
award 31 May 2002 (U.S. investor claimed damages in connection with Canadian
softwood export prohibitions; the tribunal dismissed all but the claim that Canada had
engaged in denial of fair treatment); S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Partial
Award of 13 November 2000 (tribunal found that the export ban in question was not a
requirement on “the conduct or operation of the investment”).
59

See discussion infra.
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in large part, outright or in stages [including] when [a state] subjects alien property to
taxation, regulation, or other action that is confiscatory, or that prevents, unreasonably
interferes with, or unduly delays, effective enjoyment of an alien’s property.” 60 An
indirect expropriation may occur if the investor’s expected entitlement to the benefits are
impaired by host state interference, even if property is not legally taken by the State, 61 or
when the host state itself acquires nothing of value but “at least has been the instrument
of distribution.” 62
Several Chapter 11 arbitrations have addressed the question of what constitutes
expropriation, including Azinian, 63 Metalclad, 64 Pope & Talbot,

65

and S.D. Myers. 66

Thus far none have departed from traditional notions of customary international law.
60

Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Section 712.
ICSID cases that have addressed indirect expropriation include Amco Asia Corp. v.
Republic of Indonesia, ARB/81/1; Liberian E. Timber Corp. v. Government of Liberia,
ARB/83/2 and Southern Pacific Properties Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ARB/84/3.
See generally references to works by Dolzer, Higgins and Weston cited infra.
61

Istvan Posgany, Bilateral Investment Treaties: Some Recent Examples, 1987 FOREIGN
INVESTMENT LAW JOURNAL 964.
62

ALLAHYAR MOURI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF EXPROPRIATION AS REFLECTED IN
THE WORK OF THE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL (1994) at 66; Poehlmann v. Spinnerei

AG, 3 U.S. Ct. Rest. App. 701, 702-04, 710 (1952).
63

Robert Azinian v. United Mexican States, Award on Merits, 1 November 1999, 14
ICSID REVIEW / FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW REVIEW 568. U.S. investors contracted with
a local municipality to provide waste treatment services. The tribunal concluded that the
claimant had not shown the Mexican actions to be illegal under international law.
64

Metalclad Corporation v. Government of the United Mexican States, Award on Merits
of 25 August 2000. The Tribunal ruled that “Expropriation under NAFTA includes not
only open, deliberate and acknowledged takings of property, such as outright seizure or
formal or obligatory transfer of title in favor of the host State, but also covert or
incidental interference with the use of property which has the effect of depriving the
owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic
benefit of the property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host State.” At
33, para. 103. The Tribunal also applied an “effects” test and held that the motivation or
intent of the adoption of an environmental decree was not relevant to a determination
under NAFTA article 1110.
23

III.

Arbitration and the New Host States
A. Three Illustrations
Three Canadian claims against the United States illustrate how a traditional

investor country has seen the tables turned by mandatory arbitration with foreign
investors. 67 Each case involves complaints about an American state rather than the
federal government. In Methanex California banned gasoline additives manufactured
from a feedstock produced by a Canadian company; in Loewen a Mississippi jury
awarded $500 million against a Manitoba funeral director; and in Mondev the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld the city of Boston in refusing to sell land to a
Montreal real estate developer.
In all three cases American interests were subject to adjudication outside
American courts. As discussed later, this question of forum lies at the heart of American
disquiet over NAFTA Chapter 11.

65

Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Interim Award on Merits of 26 June
2000; final award 31 May 2002. In the Interim Award of June 2000 the Tribunal
dismissed all but the claim that Canada had denied fair treatment under Article 1105, but
indicated that “creeping expropriation could be conducted by regulation, and a blanket
exception for regulatory measures would create a gaping loophole in the international
protection against expropriation.” Id at 35, para. 99. On whether there was an
expropriation, the Arbitral Tribunal indicated that the test is “whether the interference is
sufficiently restricted to support a conclusion that the property has been taken from the
owner.” See generally, Patrick Dumberry, The Quest to Define “Fair and Equitable
Treatment” for Investors under International Law, 3 J. WORLD INVESTMENT 657 (2002).
66

S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Partial Award of 13 November 2000. The
tribunal decided that the term “tantamount” in NAFTA article 1110 means “equivalent”
and is intended to capture acts of creeping expropriation but does not broaden the scope
of expropriation under customary international law.
67

The fourth claim against the United States, filed on 19 July 2000 by ADF Group of
Québec, involved a “Buy American” requirement of the Federal Highway Administration
that interfered with participation in a Virginia highway project by a Canadian
manufacturer of complex steel components.
24

The protest is pregnant with irony when one remembers how often the United
States has imposed arbitration on other countries, 68 and how American negotiators
advocated arbitration to promote the security of foreign investment over Mexico’s
longstanding opposition. 69
Two of the cases (Loewen and Mondev) are of particular significance, in that court
decisions serve as the hook on which to found a NAFTA claim. NAFTA not only
prohibits any “measure” tantamount to expropriation, 70 but also gives the term “measure”
an understandably broad scope, to include “any law, regulation, procedure, requirement
or practice.” 71 Such a reading of the concept of measure is entirely consistent with the
American position in connection with bilateral investment treaties. 72
By implicating the judiciary, NAFTA arbitrations obviously touch an especially
sensitive nerve. However, such actions follow a long line of “denial of justice” claims

68

See W. LAURENCE CRAIG, WILLIAM W. PARK & JAN PAULSSON, INTERNATIONAL
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION (3d ed. 2000), Chapter 36.
69

The NAFTA Statement of Administrative Action makes this point: “The NAFTA
provides a historic investor-state dispute settlement mechanism, so that individual U.S.
companies no longer face an unbalanced environment in an investment dispute with the
Mexican government but can seek arbitration outside Mexico by an independent body.”
See NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, TEXTS OF AGREEMENT, IMPLEMENTING
BILL, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION AND REQUIRED SUPPORTING STATEMENTS,
House Document 103-159, Vol. 1, at 685.
70

NAFTA Article 1110.

71

NAFTA Article 201. Both Loewen and Azinian (discussed supra) rejected the
suggestion that a judicial action constituted an exclusion to such a broadly defined notion
of governmental measure.
72

See VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES: POLICY AND PRACTICE,
Appendix C, at 166, noting the State Department position that bilateral investment treaty
prohibitions on expropriations apply to “essentially any measure regardless of form”
which may deprive an investor of important property rights.
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traditionally brought against developing countries 73 and recently made by an American
investor against Mexico under NAFTA. 74
1. Methanex 75
When California became concerned about risks to drinking water as a result of
leakage from underground fuel storage tanks, its Governor banned gasoline containing a
methanol-based gasoline additive called “MTBE.” 76 A Canadian corporation producing
feedstock for this additive responded by filing an arbitration claim arguing

73

See BRIERLY, supra, at pages 286-87, noting two different views on what constitutes a
denial of justice, also sometimes referred to as déni de justice. The narrower
interpretation (on occasion adopted by Latin American scholars) contends that denial of
justice exists only when foreigners have been denied access to courts. The broader view
(embraced in much English, American and Continental writing) includes substandard
judicial acts such as corruption, dishonesty, unwarranted delay and decisions imposed by
the executive. See also BROWNLIE, supra, at pages 514-16.
74

See Calmark Commercial Development, Inc. v. United States of Mexico, Notice of
Intent to Commence Arbitration filed 11 January 2002. In a case whose beginning brings
to mind the real estate development in Mondev, an American corporation which had
agreed to develop a tourist attraction in Mexico ended up paying for land which was
transferred to a third party. A lawsuit in the courts of the State of Baja California failed
to recover the misplaced investment, due to what the American claimant alleged were
procedural improprieties such as failure to give notice of defendant’s submissions,
disregard of evidence and “blatantly wrongful and unjust conclusion” in the matter. Id.,
para. 52. The NAFTA claim was based on Article 1105: “treatment in accordance with
international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.”
Supporting authorities cited by the American claimant included the Loewen case
(discussed infra) and a 1927 American claim against Mexico, United States (Laura Janes)
v. Mexico (Opinions of Commissioners 108, 1927 General Claims Commission 1926) in
which non punishment was deemed to constitute approval of wrongdoing.
75

Methanex Corp. v. USA, Amended Claim filed 12 February 2001 by Jones, Day,
Reavis & Pogue, Washington, D.C. Available through www.naftaclaims.com.
76

It is significant that the Claimant Methanex does not produce MTBE (Methyl tertiary
butyl ether), but rather the feedstock (methanol) for the banned additive. This fact seems
to have played a part in the recent partial award in this case. The arbitral tribunal appears
to have posited that the connection between methanol and the ban was too remote in the
context of NAFTA Article 1101, since the government measure did not apply to the
investor’s product itself. The ban was effective 31 December 2001. See Exec. Order No.
D-5-99 promulgated by Governor Gray Davis.
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discrimination, denial of minimum standard of treatment and improper expropriation of
its investment. 77
The filing of the claim led to protests by environmentalists and the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Charges were made that NAFTA Chapter 11,
by allowing corporations to recover for unfair treatment, favored corporate profits over
legitimate exercise of sovereignty by local governments. This arbitral process was
attacked as undemocratic, cloaked in secrecy, lacking adequate rights of appeal and
protection for equally injured domestic producers. NAFTA was further criticized as
denying the American public a right to protect its water and air. 78
2. Loewen
In Loewen v. USA, 79 a Mississippi jury verdict led to claims of failure to grant
“fair and equitable treatment” and expropriation without adequate compensation. The

77

Violations were alleged with respect to NAFTA Articles 1102, 1105 and 1110.
Methanex Corp. Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under Article 1119,
Section B, Chapter 11 of NAFTA, filed 2 July 1999. The arbitration proceeding was
brought under the UNCITRAL Rules and has already resulted in an interim ruling. See
Methanex Corp v. United States, 15 January 2001, 16 Int’l Arb. Rep. D-1 (Jan. 2001),
Decision on Authority to Accept Amicus Submissions, finding that it “could be
appropriate” for an environmental group to make submissions. UNCITRAL Rules
Article 15(1) permits conduct of the proceedings “in such manner as [the tribunal]
considers appropriate.” Amicus briefs from NAFTA member countries are permitted
under NAFTA Article 1128, which authorizes submissions on questions related to
interpretation of NAFTA.
78

For a survey of the criticisms of NAFTA provoked by Methanex, see generally Lucien
J. Dhooge, The Revenge of the Trail Smelter: Environmental Regulation as
Expropriation Pursuant to the North American Free Trade Agreement, 38 Am. Bus. L. J.
475 (2001), at 478-479, notes 18-25.
79

Loewen Group, Inc. v. U.S.A., ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/98/3, Final Award 26 June
2003 (Anthony Mason, Abner J. Mikva and Michael Mustill arbs.), 42 I.L.M. 811 (2003),
available at www.nafftaclaims.com; Interim Award on Jurisdiction, 5 January 2001.
Based on NAFTA Articles 1105 and 1110, the claim arose out of the $500 million verdict
that included $400 million in punitive damages. Appeal required a bond of 125% The
rich tapestry of this dispute is set forth in Jonathan Harr, The Burial, The New Yorker, 1
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jury had awarded half a billion dollars in favor of a Mississippi funeral director who
claimed that a Canadian buyer had breached a contract for the purchase of his funeral
parlors. When the Canadian attempted to appeal, he found that state law required the
posting of a bond as security for payment of the judgment equal to 125% of the amount
awarded. In this case the sum would have been $ 625 million, high enough to force a
substantial settlement.
The Canadian company then filed a NAFTA Chapter 11 claim against the United
States in an ICSID Additional Facility arbitration. The investor claimed that there had
been a denial of justice in a trial involving flagrant attempts to inflame jurors by casting
the Canadian party as an outsider due to differences in race, nationality and class. An
interim award decided that a court judgment can be considered a governmental
“measure” that might give rise to liability for discrimination, failure to grant “fair and
equitable treatment” and expropriation without adequate compensation. However, the
final award denied compensation due to failure to exhaust local remedies, and a change
of the Canadian claimant’s national identity following a bankruptcy reorganization as an
American entity.
3. Mondev
In the final example, a Quebec corporation commenced arbitration arising from a
decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court dismissing an action against the
city of Boston for breach of a contract to sell property in connection with municipal
redevelopment, and against the Boston Redevelopment Authority for tortious interference

November 1999, at 70, describing the backgrounds of the Mississippi plaintiff, Jeremiah
O’Keefe, his Florida lawyer, Willy Gary, the allegedly xenophobic comments to the jury,
and the circumstances surrounding the $ 175 million settlement.
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with contractual relations. 80 The developers had entered into an agreement with Boston
to acquire a parcel of downtown real estate. When the city balked at going through with
the transfer, the failure was ultimately excused on the basis that the Canadian investment
vehicle did not “follow the steps” required under the agreement, since its offer to buy the
parcel had not manifested a “precise time and place for passing papers.” 81 The claim
against the Boston Redevelopment Authority was dismissed on the basis that this public
body was immune from tort liability under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act. 82
Aggrieved by the court decision, the Montreal investor brought a $50 million
claim under the ICSID Additional Facility alleging discrimination, expropriation without
compensation and denial of “fair and equitable treatment.” The decision of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court endorsing the denial of the developer’s right to
purchase the land was described as “unprincipled” and “arbitrary.” 83
One can understand that such a proceeding might surprise many Americans.
Imagine, however, the reverse situation, in which rights of similarly situated Boston

80

Mondev International Ltd. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB
(AF)/99/2; Award of 11 October 2002 published in 42 I.L.M. 85 (2003). The arbitral
tribunal dismissed Mondev’s claims, finding that the American court decisions “did not
involve any violation of Article 1105(1) of NAFTA or otherwise.” The party-nominated
arbitrators were James Crawford (for Claimant) and Stephen Schwebel (for Respondent
US), and the Presiding Arbitrator is Ninian Stephen. See also Lafayette Place Associates
v. Boston Redevelopment Authority, 427 Mass. 509, 694 N.E.2d 820 (1998). Operating
in Boston through the limited partnership, Mondev had agreed to participate in a project
originating in an attempt to rehabilitate the so-called “combat zone,” a dilapidated area
near Boston’s downtown shopping district. Although the Supreme Judicial Court found
the contract with Boston to be enforceable, the developers were deemed to have forfeited
their rights due to lack of evidence that they were ready, able and willing to close the
sale.
81

Id. at 520.

82

Id. at 531-533. See MGL, c. 258, §§ 1, 10(c).
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investors are rebuffed by a foreign court. It is not hard to imagine New England voices
crying foul play. 84
B. Reactions and Complaints
As the first Chapter 11 cases were filed against the United States and Canada, 85
voices began to be heard saying that investment arbitration infringes national
prerogatives. Investor protection has been presented by activists as a subterfuge to
challenge laws simply because they have a negative impact on the foreign capitalist. 86 In
one New York Times article NAFTA arbitration was thus described, “Their meetings are
secret. Their members are generally unknown. The decisions they reach need not be fully
disclosed. Yet the way a small group of international tribunals handles disputes between

83

Mondev International Ltd. v. USA, Notice of Arbitration, 1 September 1999, at
page 74. ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2.
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The story in the Boston newspapers might read something like this: “Xenophobic
judge in Ruritania refused to enforce a promise to sell property to an American company.
Investor asks why it should take the trouble of entering into contracts when local
judiciary excuses breach of agreement on a technicality, citing nothing more than absence
of a ‘precise time and place for passing papers.’ The seller was granted total immunity
from liability.”
85

Thus far twenty-seven notices of intent (not all of which have been followed by claims)
have been brought under Chapter 11: nine against Canada (Ethyl, S.D. Myers, Sun Belt,
Pope & Talbot, UPS, Ketcham Investments, Crompton, Trammel Crow and Signa); ten
against Mexico (Metalclad, Karpa (a.k.a. Feldman), Adams, Azinian, Waste Management
Services I and II, Calmark Commercial Development, Halchette, GAMI Investments Inc.
and Fireman’s Fund); eight against the United States (Loewen, Methanex, Mondev, ADF
Group, Canfor, Tembec, Kenex and Doman). Cases raising environment issues include
Metalclad, Methanex, Ethyl, S.D. Myers and Crompton.
86

See generally, Charles N. Brower & Lee A. Steven, Who Then Should Judge?:
Developing the International Rule of Law under NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 Chi. J. Int’l. L.
193, 198 (2001); Daniel M. Price, Some Observations on Chapter Eleven of NAFTA, 23
Hastings Int’l. & Comp. L. Rev. 421 (2000); Frederick M. Abbott, The Political
Economy of NAFTA Chapter Eleven: Equality Before the Law and the Boundaries of
North American Integration, 23 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 303, 306 (2000).
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investors and foreign governments has led to national laws being revoked, justice systems
questioned and environmental regulations challenged.” 87
Among the most negative reactions to investment arbitration, a December 2001
advertisement in the Washington Post attacked investment arbitration under the headline
“Fast Track Attack on America’s Values,” which appeared against the background of the
preamble to the US Constitution (“We the people...”) with captions that read: “Secret
Courts for Corporations” and “Taxpayer Dollars for Foreign Polluters.” 88
The full-page advertisement urged rejection of the trade bill (ultimately passed by one
vote in the House of Representatives) giving the President “fast track” authority to
negotiate agreements in the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). These agreements
could extend to thirty-four Western Hemisphere countries based on the NAFTA model.
In one well-publicized television show hosted by Bill Moyers, NAFTA was
labeled a “sophisticated extortion racket,” and “an end-run around the Constitution” in
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See, e.g., Anthony De Palma, NAFTA’s Powerful Little Secret, New York Times,
Sunday Late Edition, 11 March 2001, Section 3, at 1. For an attempt at a more broadbased rebuttal of claims that international trade undermines governmental regulatory
structures, see Ronald A Cass and John R. Haring, Domestic Regulation and
International Trade: Where's the Race? -- Lessons from Telecommunications and Export
Controls, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF ROBERT E. HUDEC 111 (Daniel L.M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds.,
Cambridge University Press 2002); also published in 11 JOURNAL DES ÉCONOMISTES ET
DES ÉTUDES HUMAINES 531 (2001).
88

Sponsored by Ralph Nader’s “Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch,” the publication
referred to possible extension of a NAFTA provision permitting “foreign corporations to
sue the federal government in secret tribunals, demanding our tax dollars as payment for
complying with U.S. health, safety and pollution laws.” The advertisement continued
that foreign manufacturers of toxic chemicals could use “private courts” (i.e., arbitration)
“to sue U.S. taxpayers . . . if zoning rules kept them from building a chemical plant near a
school.” Referring to arbitration’s confidentiality, the advertisement said that “even the
identity of judges can be kept secret indefinitely,” ending with the rhetorical question,
“Whose side is Congress on--foreign corporations or the American people?” See
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which “secret NAFTA tribunals can force taxpayers to pay billions of dollars in
lawsuits.” 89
Environmentalists have been particularly vocal in saying that NAFTA makes it
possible to undermine legitimate governmental regulations. 90 Chapter 11 arbitration is
portrayed as a forum insulated from rightful domestic political and legal safeguards. 91
The World Wildlife Fund and the Institute for Sustainable Development published a
report entitled Private Rights, Public Problems which labels NAFTA Chapter 11
arbitration as “one-sided” and “lacking transparency,” and concludes that arbitration is
“shockingly unsuited to the task of balancing private rights against public goods.” 92

Washington Post, 5 December 2001, at A-5, placed by the Global Trade Watch division
of Public Citizen (www.citizen.org).
89

The transcript of the PBS special series “Trading Democracy,” which aired on
1 February 2002, can be obtained on www.pbs.org/now/transcript.
90

No administrative veto prohibits arbitration of disputes implicating environmental
measures. NAFTA simply provides that nothing in Chapter 11 shall be construed as
preventing adoption of measures “to ensure that investment activity … is undertaken in a
manner sensitive to environmental concerns.” See NAFTA Article 1114.
91

See, e.g., comments at “Public Citizen” web page (www.citizen.org). See also Howard
Mann and Konrad von Moltke, NAFTA’s Chapter 11 and the Environment: Addressing
the Impacts of the Investor-State Process on the Environment, International Institute for
Sustainable Development Working Paper (1999) (http://iisd1.iisd.ca/pdf/nafta.pdf).
Complaints include the “virtually unfettered right of foreign investors to initiate direct
actions against their host governments” and the “aggressive use of this process to
challenge public policy and public welfare measures.” The authors complain about
“uncertainty and unpredictability for environmental regulations,” lack of procedural or
public interest safeguards, “non-transparent, secretive and non-appealable” arbitration, all
of which mean that host governments must “pay foreign investors in order to be able to
effectively regulate the environment.” See also Todd Weiler, A First Look at the Interim
Merits Award in S.D. Myers v. Canada: It Is Possible to Balance Legitimate
Environmental Concerns with Investment Protection, 24 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.
173 (2001); Joseph de Pencier, Investment, Environment and Dispute Settlement:
Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter Eleven, 23 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 409
(2000).
92

Howard Mann, Private Rights, Public Goods (International Institute for Sustainable
Development and World Wildlife Fund, 2001), at 46. The report by Dr. Mann, a lawyer
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Members of Congress also complain that NAFTA tribunals override health and
labor laws, and express alarm that the United States federal government might be held
liable for the idiosyncratic acts of local authorities and state courts. 93 During debate on an
appropriations bill, a Congressman lamented that the Justice Department might have to
sue local governments to enforce NAFTA decisions, and in a burst of fervor proclaimed,
“This is nuts! ... We must stand together to protect the sovereignty of American laws.” 94
A recent indication of American discontent with the NAFTA model for
investment dispute resolution came in response to legislative efforts to extend trade
benefits to Latin American countries. The Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee

based in Ottawa, led to follow-up commentary in Canada and the United States that
furthered the negative characterization of NAFTA. See Mark Thomsen, Companies
Using NAFTA to Undermine Legitimate Regulations, 12 June 2001, reported at
www.socialfunds.com/news; Chantal Blouin, NAFTA Goes Too Far on Investor
Protection, North-South Institute, 31 August 2001, reported at www.nsi-ins.ca/ensi/news.
93

See debate on HR 2670, an appropriations bill for the Commerce, Justice and State
Departments, at 145 Cong. Rec., HR, 106th Congress, 1st Session, 5 August 1999, at H7368. Federal statute prohibits challenge of state laws inconsistent with NAFTA, “except
in an action brought by the United States [i.e., the federal government] for the purposes
of declaring such law or application invalid.” 19 U.S.C. § 3312(b)(2), codifying § 102(b)
of NAFTA Implementation Act. Similar protections apply to state laws in conflict with
Uruguay Round trade agreements. 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(2). An amendment to the bill
offered by Rep. Kucinich (Ohio) would have prohibited the Department of Justice from
using appropriated funds to challenge state laws that run afoul of NAFTA, for example
the Mississippi bond requirement in Loewen. The amendment failed 196 to 226.
94

145 Cong. Rec., HR, 106th Congress, 1st Session, 5 August 1999, at H-7368.
Congressman Tierney (Massachusetts) expressed concern that the pace of globalization
might result in “sacrificing state and local laws at the altar of ill-defined international
investor rights.” Congressman Shows (Mississippi) opposed allowing “American
taxpayer dollars [to] pay American lawyers to help a foreign corporation fight American
state laws in court.” Id. Congressman Bonior (Michigan) added, “The question ... is very
clear: Should the rights of an investor come before the rights to enact a chemical ban to
prevent cancer?” Id. Observers will note, of course, that NAFTA prohibits
discrimination, not the right to ban carcinogens. The essence of the concern would seem
to be that arbitrators hearing anti-discrimination claims might strike down otherwise valid
health regulations.
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wrote to the Bush Administration endorsing attempts to deny foreign investors any
substantive rights not given to American investors, to establish an appellate review of
NAFTA awards, 95 and to support government screening of arbitration requests to reduce
the prospect that they are ever considered by arbitrators. 96
While not all legislators accepted the wisdom of such measures, 97 some went
even further. Senator Kerry of Massachusetts proposed amendments to the Andean
Trade Preferences Act which would have given the investor state 98 the right to prohibit
arbitration on the basis that the claim “lacks legal merit” and established a “single
appellate body” to review decisions in investment arbitration. 99

95

Letter of 26 March 2002 from Max Baucus to Trade Representative Robert Zoellick,
discussed in Rossella Brevetti, Baucus Welcomes Options Administration Is Considering
on Investor-State Disputes, BNA Int'l Trade, Vol. 19, No. 13 at 529 (28 March 2002).
96

A similar screening mechanism already exists with respect to expropriation claims that
implicate tax measures. See NAFTA Article 2103(6), discussed infra.
97

On 28 March 2002 the Senate Finance Committee’s ranking Republican Charles
Grassley urged Trade Representative Zoellick to reject such screening. See Rosella
Brevetti, Grassley Urges Zoellick to Reject Government Screening for Investor Suits,
Regulation Law & Economics, No. 62, 1 April 2002, at A-6. Industry groups, including
the National Association of Manufacturers, have also expressed concern for the
preservation of investor protections for American-owned businesses abroad. See
Brevetti, 26 March 2002, supra. See also discussion of HR 3005 in Chris Rugaber and
Rossella Brevetti, In Partisan Markup, House Ways and Means Approves TPA
Legislation, International Trade Reporter Current Reports, 11 October 2001.
98

While some might imagine that this veto right would be given to the host state, in fact
the Kerry proposals accorded this to the “competent authority in the investor’s country.”
See SA 3430, proposed Section 2102(b)(3)(H)(i) & (ii). This approach follows the lines
of traditional practice in matters of state responsibility, with a capital exporting country
espousing its national’s claim in order to assert protection of the investor’s foreign assets.
99

The Kerry proposals would also have modified the substantive contours of what
NAFTA arbitrators could award, requiring inter alia that trade agreements with
investment provisions (i) ensure that foreign investors receive no greater legal rights than
American citizens; (ii) exclude compensation for regulatory measures that cause “mere
diminution” in the value of property; and (iii) ensure that standards for minimum
treatment grant foreigners no greater legal rights than possessed by American citizens
under the Constitution’s due process clause. See Kerry amendment to Andean Trade
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As finally enacted, last year’s trade legislation includes several provisions
designed to restrict the type of arbitration provisions normally found in investment
treaties. After a self-congratulatory preamble to the effect that the United States
“provides a high level of protection for investment”, the Trade Act of 2002 defines
American trade negotiating objectives to include making sure that foreign investors
receive no “greater substantive rights with respect to investment protections” than
domestic investors – thus echoing objections to investment arbitration long propounded
by developing countries. The Act sets forth the means to this end, including an
improvement of investor/host state dispute resolution through “mechanisms to eliminate
frivolous claims,” and “an appellate body … to “provide coherence to interpretations of
investment provisions in trade agreements” as well as a mandate to make public all
investment arbitration proceedings and to allow amicus curiae submissions from
business, labor and non-governmental organizations. 100
Some groups in Canada have likewise complained bitterly about NAFTA,
alleging that it serves “to limit the legitimate rights of governments to regulate.” 101 An

Preference Expansion Act, H. R. 3009 (107th Cong. 2nd Sess.), Senate Amendment 3430
to Section 2102(b) of the Andean Trade Preferences Act, Cong. Rec. 16 May 2002 S
4504. The amendment was tabled 21 May 2002
100

See Section 2102(b)(3) of Trade Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210), 16 Stat. 933, codified
19 U.S.C. 3802.
101

See Nihal Sherif, Canadian Memo Identifies Options for Changing NAFTA
Investment Rules, Inside US Trade at 20 (12 February 1999) (commenting upon a memo
of the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade). See also
discussion of Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Award of 26 June 2000 (discussed 16 Int’l Arb.
Rep. 20, July 2001), finding that Canadian export controls on softwood lumber
discriminated against an Oregon investor; final award 31 May 2002. See also Todd
Weiler, A First Look at the Interim Merits Award in S.D. Myers v. Canada: It Is Possible
to Balance Legitimate Environmental Concerns with Investment Protection, 24 Hastings
Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 173 (2001); Joseph de Pencier, Investment, Environment and
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editorial in the Toronto Globe and Mail criticized the confidentiality inherent in
arbitration as a “cone of silence,” claiming that “lawsuits against the Canadian
government under NAFTA’s Chapter 11 end up being composed almost entirely of rumor
and leaks rather than official documents.” 102
C. Understandable Concerns
Many host state concerns about NAFTA arbitration are understandable.
Considerable ambiguity exists with respect to what constitutes “fair and equitable”
treatment. The law on expropriation is also relatively malleable, with little consensus on
the standards that determine when administrative regulations give rise to a governmental
taking that requires compensation. Must a claimant show an abuse of power by the host
government? Must the nationalization include an element of bad faith? May a foreign
investor recover in circumstances where the claim of a domestic owner would fail?
The crux of the problem is that not all discrimination is outright and abrupt.
Arbitrary taking of property may occur in a gradual fashion through abusive manipulation
of the legal system. Various names have been applied to such de facto nationalization:
“creeping expropriation,” “indirect expropriation,” and “constructive expropriation,” as

Dispute Settlement: Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter Eleven, 23 Hastings Int’l &
Comp. L. Rev. 409 (2000).
102

NAFTA Cone of Silence, Toronto Globe and Mail, 26 August 1998, at A-14.
Responses to this editorial include letters to the editor by Sergio Marchi (Canadian Trade
Minister), who asserted that investor rights must not “inhibit the sovereign responsibility
of governments to legislate and regulate in the public interest” (Globe and Mail,
31 August 1998, at A-12) and Maude Barlow, who asserted that NAFTA was the “first
international treaty in history to grant foreign investors the right to bypass their own
governments in a trade dispute and sue the government of another country for cash
compensation” and that NAFTA arbitrators were all “trade bureaucrats.” (Globe and
Mail, 5 September 1998, at D-7).
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well as measures “tantamount to” or “equivalent to” expropriation. 103 Indirect
nationalization through improper administrative measures has long served as a back door
to deprive the investor of its assets. 104 In some cases a taking might occur through nonaction, as when a state refuses to interfere with popular seizure of foreign property or
fails to fulfill a contractual obligation to grant fiscal benefits.
Expropriation under the guise of otherwise valid regulations is often easier to
recognize than to define, as illustrated by the practice of the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC). 105 A federally chartered agency of the United States government,
OPIC insures American investors against expropriation and currency inconvertibility in
connection with their foreign investments. 106 Notwithstanding OPIC’s broad definition
of expropriation, 107 the experience of investors seeking reimbursement has not always
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See generally Burns H. Weston, Constructive Takings under International Law: A
Modest Foray into the Problem of “Creeping Expropriation,” 16 Va. J. Int’l L. 103
(1975); Rosalyn Higgins, The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in
International Law, 176 Recueil des Cours (Hague 1982), at 259; Rudolf Dolzer, Indirect
Expropriation of Alien Property, 1 ICSID Rev./FILJ 41 (1986). See also discussion of
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) infra. See generally, Markham Ball,
Assessing Damages in Claims by Investors Against States, 16 ICSID REVIEW/FOREIGN
INVESTMENT LAW J. 408 (2001).
104

See, e.g., Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain) (2d
Phase), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 9 I.L.M. 227 (1970). By refusal to authorize transfer of foreign
currency to pay Sterling bond interest, Spain allegedly engineered the bankruptcy of a
Canadian owned company as a way to deprive the parent of its property. See also V.V.
Veeder, The Lena Goldfields Arbitration: The Historical Roots of Three Ideas, 47 Int’l &
Comp. L. Q. 747 (1998) (discussion of Goldfields v. USSR, Judgment of 3 September
1930).
105

See generally Vance Koven, Expropriation and the “Jurisprudence” of OPIC,
22 Harvard Int’l L. J. 269 (1981); Wolfgang Peter, Arbitration and Renegotiation of
International Investment Agreements (2d ed. 1995), at 348-357.
106

The Contract of Insurance provides for controversies between OPIC and the investor
to be settled by arbitration.
107

OPIC’s current Program Handbook (available at www.opic.gov) defines
expropriation coverage as protection against “nationalization, confiscation or
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been consistent. 108 In many instances jurists will find difficulty establishing intellectually
rigorous standards, and thus will be consigned to a “we-know-it-when-we-see-it” attitude
toward de facto takings.
Not all scholars see the case law of expropriation as a threat to environmental
regulations. One thoughtful study of regulatory takings has identified a number of
standards applied in nationalization cases, such as proportionality, necessity and nondiscrimination. 109 Not every governmental measure that diminishes the worth of an
investment will require compensation, and some balance must be struck between the right
to regulate and the preservation of property values. At the least, the investor has the right
to be concerned with uncertainty and surprise and breaches of prior commitments. 110

expropriation of an enterprise, including “creeping” expropriation – unlawful government
actions that deprive the investor of fundamental rights in a project” but excluding losses
due to “lawful regulation or taxation” and “actions provoked or instigated by the
investor.” Id. at 11. See also www.opic.gov/finance/products/expropriation.htm;
Jonathan Haddon, PLI Presentation February 1999, 784 PLI/Comm 271.
108

In one case OPIC acknowledged that rights could be denied through a “chain of
conduct,” but found that the investor’s control over its assets continued even after it lost
managerial and shareholder control of the investment vehicle. See Cabot Int’l Capital
Corp., Contract 8383, Memorandum of Determination (27 December 1980). See also
Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. OPIC, American Arbitration Association Award
reprinted in 17 Int’l Legal Mats. 1321 (1978), motion to vacate denied, D.C. Cir. (26
February 1980), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 2964 (1980). At that time the OPIC Contract of
Insurance defines “expropriatory action” to include actions that prevent (a) payment of
amounts due in respect of securities, (b) effective exercise of fundamental rights, (c)
disposition of securities, (d) exercise of effective control or (e) repatriation of earnings.
109

See Thomas Waelde & Abba Kolo, Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection
and ‘Regulatory Taking’ in International Law, 50 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 811 (2001).
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Waelde and Kolo conclude, “[I]t is unlikely that courts or arbitrators will find a
compensable expropriation in cases where governments issue environmental regulation
for legitimate purposes in accordance with the state of scientific knowledge and accepted
international guidelines.” Id. at 846. The authors remain optimistic that regulatory
taking would be found “only when the environment becomes a pretext for domestic
protectionism and when elements of discrimination or breach of governmental
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To some extent the United States may have become a victim of its own success.
In the past, Americans sometimes persuaded arbitrators to adopt broad standards
providing “protection and security” that might override otherwise legitimate domestic
laws. 111 Regulations which in a domestic context constituted normal protection of the
public interest appeared in a cross-border transaction as violations of international law.
Thus Americans were, in Shakespeare’s words, “hoist with their own petard,” 112 having
contributed to the creation of pro-investor substantive standards applied by international
tribunals, and to a blurring of distinctions between state-private proceedings (“mixed
arbitration”) and commercial arbitration exclusively among private parties. 113
D. Limiting the Scope of Investment Arbitration
1. Compromises to Reconcile Competing Goals
NAFTA’s drafters recognized that they were combining a trade agreement with
an investment treaty, and that arbitration of investment disputes might have a disruptive
effect on other NAFTA commitments including trade in goods and procurement.

commitments or [when regulation has been used] to extract benefits unrelated to the
legitimate purpose of the regulation....” Id.
111

See, e.g., American Mfg. & Trading (AMT). v. Zaire, 36 I.L.M. 1531 (1997), arising
under the US-Zaire 1984 Bilateral Investment Treaty and involving damage to property
of an American subsidiary by the Zaire army. Referring to the host state’s “obligation of
vigilance” to “ensure the full enjoyment of protection and security of [the US company’s]
investment,” the arbitral tribunal stated that Zaire “should not be permitted to invoke its
own legislation to detract from any such obligation.” Id. at 1548. The case is cited in
Methanex Amended Claim (12 February 2001) at 65.
112

See Hamlet, Act III, Scene 4 (“for ‘tis sport to have the engineer hoist with his own
petard”), in which the Prince of Denmark makes plans to catch the conspirators in his
father’s murder.
113

For a comparison of stricter and more flexible approaches to long-term cross-border
contracts, see Nagla Nassar, Security of Contracts Revisited (1995).
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Moreover, there was recognition that investment arbitration posed special problems with
respect to vital national prerogatives in tax and financial services.
Multiple compromises were made to reconcile NAFTA’s competing goals. For
example, inconsistencies between Chapter 11 and other NAFTA chapters are resolved in
favor of the latter, 114 and investment is limited by a definition numerus clausus indicating
what “investment means” rather than what “investment includes.” 115 Excluded from the
definition of investment are loans to state enterprises and money claims arising solely
from contracts for the sale of goods or services or the extension of commercial credit. 116
The creation of intellectual property rights will generally not give rise to rights to claim
compensation for expropriation, 117 and non-discriminatory measures of general
application will not be considered tantamount to expropriation of a loan or debt security
merely because they impose an increased cost that causes debtor default. 118
Of particular interest are the limitations on investment arbitration that implicate
tax and finance, two areas of particular sensitivity to economic sovereignty. As discussed
below, member states have the right in certain circumstances to block or to modify
Chapter 11 arbitration in both of these domains.
2.

Expropriation Through Fiscal Measures
a) Distinguishing Abusive Taxation

114

Article 1112.

115

Article 1138.

116

Article 11389.

117

Article 1110 does not apply to the creation or limitation of intellectual property rights
to the extent consistent with Chapter XVII, which addresses intellectual property
explicitly.
118

Article 1110(8).
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Few areas illustrate the complex interaction of arbitration and sovereignty
concerns more sharply than taxation. The power to raise revenue by forced levies is an
attribute of sovereignty that is less negotiable than others. 119 Yet uncompensated
nationalization often takes the form of excessive fiscal measures, designed either to force
the foreign owner to abandon the investment by taxing away its economic value, or to
subject an investor’s competitors to a more favorable tax regime. While escaping precise
definition, such subtler forms of expropriation can deprive an investor of wealth
arbitrarily as effectively as explicit nationalization.
Evaluating such “creeping expropriation” does not lend itself to facile analysis.
Distinctions must be made between normal and excessive taxation, a task that implicates
culturally influenced notions of the “right” level of tax. 120 From one perspective taxation
constitutes a form of asset seizure (echoed in the American catch phrase “the power to
tax is the power to destroy” 121) in which fiscal authorities take money from its current
owner (the taxpayer) and give it to someone else (the state).
The competing characterizations of tax may be distinctions without a difference,
however. Fiscal measures inevitably involve an element of expropriation. The only
119

One remembers that it was a tax revolt that forced King John of England to sign the
Magna Charta in 1215. And few scholars challenge Lord Mansfield’s “Revenue Rule”
preventing enforcement of foreign tax judgments. See Holman v. Johnson, 98 Engl. Rep.
1120 (K.B. 1775). For later articulations of this principle, see HM Queen v. Gilbertson,
597 F.2d 1161 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580 (1st Cir. 1996).
120

Justice Holmes distinguished between a penalty intended as a “discouragement” to
behavior and a tax that “may be part of an encouragement [to actions] when seen in its
organic connection with the whole.” Compañía General de Tabaco de Filipinas v.
Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S. 87 (1927), at 100.
121

The original US Supreme Court citation was: “An unlimited power to tax involves,
necessarily, a power to destroy; because there is a limit beyond which no institution and
no property can bear taxation.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 327
(1819), striking down a state tax on a federally chartered bank.
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question is whether they are “normal” taxes or are the type of punitive measure intended
to confiscate foreign investment.
The problematic nature of using arbitration to settle claims that taxation
constitutes “creeping expropriation” was foreseen when NAFTA was drafted. The
Chapter 11 dispute resolution process would be misused and corrupted if “ordinary”
fiscal measures gave rise to expropriation claims. Consequently, the fiscal
administrations of host and investor countries have been given the task of making a
preliminary cut between normal and abnormal taxes.
If an alleged expropriation is accomplished through “taxation measures,” the
competent fiscal authorities of the relevant states may veto the investor’s right to
arbitrate. 122 At the time of advising the host state of its intention to commence
arbitration, the investor must also submit the tax measure to the appropriate fiscal
authorities. The investor may proceed to arbitration only if the competent authorities “do
not agree to consider the issue or, having agreed to consider it, fail to agree that the
measure is not an expropriation.” 123

122

NAFTA Article 2103(6) states that Article 1110 provisions concerning expropriation
“shall apply to taxation measures except that no investor may invoke that Article as the
basis for a claim [for investment dispute resolution], where it has been determined
pursuant to this paragraph that the measure is not an expropriation.” Thus far, at least
one case (the Karpa claim against Mexico) implicated tax measures. The competent
authorities agreed that one of the three measures was not an expropriation, and thus the
arbitration did not go forward on that question. As to two other measures, however, there
was no agreement, and thus for those issues the arbitration proceeded.
123

It is uncertain whether an investor’s disregard of reference to the competent
authorities (either in bad faith or due to an innocent misunderstanding) would provide an
opportunity for sua sponte intervention by tax authorities. Whether or not permitted,
state intervention would not seem mandated. Rather, without an opinion from the
relevant fiscal authorities, an expropriation claim would lie beyond the arbitrators’
jurisdiction.
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This awkwardly drafted “negative deadlock” provision gives the competent
authorities six months to decide the question, failing which the investor may proceed to
arbitration. 124 In attempting to distinguish normal from excessive taxation, fiscal
authorities inevitably can be expected to rely on culturally influenced notions of tax. 125
NAFTA does not suggest that tax matters cannot be arbitrated. Rather, the treaty
says that fiscal authorities in host and investor states together may block the arbitral
proceedings by agreeing “that the [tax] measure is not an expropriation.” 126 Thus if the
United States is accused of expropriating a Canadian investor’s property, investment
arbitration would be barred only if both the US Department of the Treasury and the
Canadian Department of Finance concluded that no expropriation had taken place. 127

124

The English language version contains a slight ambiguity, providing for arbitration to
go forward “[i]f the competent authorities do not agree to consider the issue or, having
agreed to consider it, fail to agree that the measure is not an expropriation within a period
of six months of such referral [by the investor].” To interpret the six month limit as
applying only to competent authorities who agreed to hear the matter (as contrasted to
ignoring or refusing to consider the investor’s request), would make little sense in this
context
.
125

For example, Americans can be expected to look to the U.S. tax system, based on the
same approach used to characterize “income tax” for purposes of the foreign tax credit.
See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 901-2(a); Bank of America Nat’l Trust & Savings Ass’n v. United
States, 459 F.2d 513, 515 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (“It is now settled that the question of whether a
foreign tax is an ‘income tax’ ... must be decided under criteria established by our
revenue laws and court decisions, and that the foreign tax must be the substantial
equivalent of an income tax as the term is understood in the United States”).

126

The text of NAFTA, Article 2103(6) does not make clear whether a “tax veto”
requires unanimity of all three competent authorities, or only from the tax administrations
of the investor and host state. In practice only the latter two administrations would be
directly concerned, although the third country might argue for inclusion on the theory that
such decisions have policy implications affecting all NAFTA members.
127

See NAFTA Annex 2103(6). The competent authority for the United States would be
the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Tax Policy), for Canada it would be the Assistant
Deputy Minister for Tax Policy, and for Mexico it would be the Deputy Minister of
Revenue of the Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (Ministry of Finance and Public
Credit).
43

Presumably the Canadian authorities would hesitate to acquiesce in the plundering of its
citizens merely because such theft was dressed in fiscal garb. Thus the capital exporter’s
government is given a protective role, in that refusal to join the veto authorizes
arbitration.
The tax veto by its terms applies only to claims of improper expropriation under
NAFTA Article 1110. By contrast, claims for breaches of other host state duties, such as
“fair and equitable treatment”, might possibly escape the jurisdiction of the respective
national fiscal authorities.
b) Impact of NAFTA Concerns on Tax Treaty Arbitration
Before moving on, it is worth noting that the perception of arbitration as an
abdication of sovereignty will likely affect attempts to eliminate another barrier to crossborder investment arbitration: asymmetrical transfer pricing adjustments by national tax
authorities. When two countries disagree on how to interpret an income tax treaty, the
task of resolving the difference falls either to national court actions or to joint efforts by
the tax administrations to work out differences on a voluntary basis. Neither alternative
is satisfactory. Judicial proceedings lack political neutrality and yield inconsistent
results. And the process for “mutual agreement” among competent fiscal authorities is
fraught with delays and uncertainty.
The problem is particularly acute when the tax treatment of a company in one
country (in the form of deductions, for example) does not accord with that of an affiliate
in the other (where items of income might be included). The lack of fiscal symmetry
creates an economic double taxation that distorts cross-border capital flows.
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In response, scholars and non-governmental organizations have suggested
arbitration as a means to address income tax treaty disputes. 128 To date, however, income
tax treaty arbitration remains more aspiration than reality. 129 While some treaties include
language raising the prospect of arbitration, these provisions operate only if the two
countries agree after a controversy arises. Such provisions have never been implemented,
due to the contracting states’ inability to reach accord when a dispute actually occurs.
Only the new Austro-German treaty imposes a duty to arbitrate treaty differences without
further negotiation.
To remedy this, the International Chamber of Commerce 130 and the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development have issued policy papers suggesting
arbitration to resolve inconsistency tax treaty application. 131 The International Fiscal
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See, e.g., William W. Park, Income Tax Treaty Arbitration, 31 TAX MANAGEMENT
INT’L J. 219 (May 2002); GUSTAF LINDENCRONA & NILS MATTSON, ARBITRATION IN
TAXATION (1981); Jean-Marie Henckaerts, EC Arbitration Convention for Transfer
Pricing Disputes, 10 J INT’ ARB. 111 (Sept 1993); Paul R. McDaniel, NAFTA and
Formulary Apportionment, in Alpert and van Raad supra, at 293 (cited in this note);
William W. Park, Finality and Fairness in Tax Arbitration, 11 J INT’L ARB. 19 (June
1994).
129

One practitioner has remarked a bit whimsically that ever since 1981, tax arbitration is
“an idea whose time is about to come.” David R. Tillinghast, Choice of Issues to be
Submitted to Arbitration Under Income Tax Conventions, in ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL
TAXATION 349 (H. Alpert and K. van Raad, eds, 1993).
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ICC Commission on Taxation, Arbitration in International Tax Matters, Doc. No.
180/438 (3 May 2000)
(www.iccwbo.org/home/statements_rules/statements/2000/arbitration_tax.asp); ICC
Commerce Commission on Taxation, Arbitration in International Tax Matters, Draft
Bilateral Convention Article, Doc. No. 180/455 Rev. (10 September 2001).
131

In 1995 the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
issued a confidential study on the topic, whose conclusions are being reconsidered as this
paper is drafted. Although its contents have not been made public, the paper has been the
object of considerable informal discussion among international tax lawyers. See OECD,
Committee on Fiscal Affairs, The Role of Arbitration Procedures in Resolving Tax
Disputes (11 January 1995), DAFFE/CFA (95) 12.
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Association (IFA) has sponsored a study on the topic. 132 Discussion of the topic has been
organized by both the Tax Council Policy Institute 133 and the American Society of
International Law. 134
Objections to these sensible suggestions include the alleged infringement of
sovereignty constituted by arbitration, with much of the argument echoing a less
sophisticated version of the complaints voiced about NAFTA Chapter 11. However, as
Rudyard Kipling might write, this is another story for another day.
3. Financial Services
NAFTA provisions on financial services generally trump inconsistent stipulations
in Chapter 11. 135 Under Chapter 14, the host state can invoke prudential concerns related
to protection of depositors, financial markets and the maintenance of safe and sound
financial institutions. 136 On request of a member state, arbitrators must refer the matter to
the NAFTA Financial Services Committee (“Committee”) for a decision on whether the
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See also International Fiscal Association, Resolution of Tax Treaty Conflicts by
Arbitration, 18e IFA Congress Seminar Series (Kluwer 1993).
133

Proceedings of Conference held 8 February 2002, forthcoming in George Mason Law
Review, Volume 10, No. 4.
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American Society of International Law, 97th Annual Meeting, 3 April 2003,
Washington, D.C., Arbitration of Disputes Under Income Tax Treaties (H.J. Ault, D.R.
Tillinghast & W.W. Park).
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Article 1101(3) provides that Chapter 11 “does not apply to measures adopted or
maintained by a [NAFTA country] to the extent that they are covered by Chapter
Fourteen (Financial Services).” Under Article 1401, the “minimum standard of
treatment” provisions (Article 1105) do not apply to investment in financial services.
136

Pursuant to Article 1410, none of the investment protections prevent a NAFTA Party
from adopting reasonable measures for prudential reasons such as “protection of
investors, depositors … financial market participants, … the maintenance of the safety
[and] soundness … of financial institutions, and ensuring the integrity and stability of a
[country’s] financial system,” nor from taking non-discriminatory measure of general
application in pursuit of monetary and credit or exchange rate policies.
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prudential concerns are valid defenses to an investor’s claim, which decision is binding
on the tribunal. 137
If the Committee makes no decision within sixty days, the host state or the
investor’s country may request establishment of an arbitral panel convened under
NAFTA’s institutional (state-to-state) dispute resolution provisions.138 The panel’s
report, like the Committee’s decision, binds the arbitrators. If no request for such dispute
resolution has been made within ten days of the expiration of the sixty days for panel
action, the arbitral tribunal may proceed to adjudicate the claim.
IV.

Old Problems, New Perspectives
A. International Commercial Decision-making
Most of the current questions about investment arbitration did not originate with

NAFTA. Rather, the perceived novelty of the rhetoric derives from a change in the angle
from which arbitration is observed. Misgivings are new only in that Canada and the
United States now articulate variations on themes long advanced by Latin American and
African countries forced to arbitrate disputes over natural resources, the environment and
other vital elements of national life. Changing hats from a capital exporter’s fedora to a
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See NAFTA Article 1415(2). The term “Committee” is defined in annex 2001.2(A).
The term “Tribunal” carries over the Chapter 11 taxonomy for the body of arbitrators
deciding a particular dispute.
138

See NAFTA Article 1415(3) and 2008 et seq. Such an arbitral panel is to be
constituted in accordance with Article 1414 (see Article 1415(3)) , chosen from a special
financial services roster to render a decision
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host state’s sombrero, the United States has come to a new appreciation of the
predicaments experienced by capital importers. 139
The debate is essentially about control of the dispute resolution process: not just
what standards apply to matters such as expropriation, but who (courts or arbitrators)
decides questions with a direct effect on the economic interests of both the investor and
the host state. The substantive norms governing expropriation and treatment of aliens
remain basically unchanged, in that international law has long held states liable for injury
to aliens. The unique aspect of NAFTA lies in its creation of a private right of action by
which foreign investors bypass the political hurdles to obtaining the diplomatic protection
of their home country.
To some observers, NAFTA arbitral tribunals appear as courts of appeal on vital
regulatory matters that discriminate against foreign investment or constitute illegal taking
of an alien-owned property. In fact, however, Chapter 11 tribunals have no such power,
but may review only government measures that violate the NAFTA treaty obligations. 140
Consequently, disquiet arises over the prospect that arbitrators may decide
differently than would national judges. In some instances this means that foreign
claimants will receive better treatment than domestic courts give similarly situated local
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See M. SORNARAJAH, THE SETTLEMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES (2000);
WOLFGANG PETER, ARBITRATION AND RENEGOTIATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
AGREEMENTS (2d ed. 1995).
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In a Chapter 11 arbitration brought by American investors against Mexico, the
arbitral tribunal noted, “The possibility of holding a State internationally liable for
judicial decisions does not, however, entitle a claimant to seek international review of the
national court decisions as though the international jurisdiction seised has plenary
jurisdiction. This is not true generally, and it is not true for NAFTA. What must be shown
is that the court decision itself constitutes a violation of the treaty…..Claimants must
show either a denial of justice, or a pretence of form to achieve an internationally
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claimants. Such differences should not be surprising. Business managers have
traditionally favored arbitration in overseas transactions precisely because an arbitrator
may see things more dispassionately than a host state judge. Moreover, investors from
industrialized countries have long insisted on fair dealing for themselves, regardless of
how poorly a host state might treat its own people.
Anti-NAFTA concerns rest in part on what has traditionally been considered a
strong point of international arbitration: the general predisposition of those chosen to
arbitrate international disputes. Experienced commercial arbitrators generally will see
their mandate as giving effect to the parties’ shared ex ante expectations, finding the facts
and applying the law in the most dispassionate and correct fashion possible. Quite
understandably, arbitrators do not normally see themselves as guardians of the public
interest. 141 In the context of NAFTA Chapter 11, these arbitral virtues may at some point
be affected by the more public dimensions of the controverted investments.
Ironically, NAFTA Chapter 11 gives ingenious lawyers the opportunity to present
on an international level the type of “due process” and “equal protection” arguments

unlawful end.” Azinian v. United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2)
Award on Merits of 1 November 1999, paragraph 99, page 29.
141

This does not mean, however, that an arbitrator can ignore mandatory public norms
(lois de police) imposed by the place of contract performance. See Pierre Mayer,
Mandatory Rules of Law in International Arbitration, 2 Arb. Int'l 274 (1986); Pierre
Mayer, Les Lois de Police Etrangères, 1981 J. Dr. Int'l 277; Pierre Mayer, Reflections on
the International Arbitrator’s Duty to Apply the Law, 17 Arb. Int’l 235 (2001) (noting
that “the relationship linking an arbitrator to the law is much more complex than the
relationship that ties judges to it”). See generally Abul F.M. Maniruzzaman,
International Arbitrator and Mandatory Public Law Rules in the Context of State
Contracts: An Overview, 7 J. Int’l Arb. 53 (September 1999); Abul F.M. Maniruzzaman,
Internationalization of Foreign Investment Agreements, 1 J. World Investment 293
(December 2000); Abul F.M. Maniruzzaman, The Lex Mercatoria and International
Contracts: A Challenge for International Commercial Arbitration?, 14 Am. U. Int’l L.
Rev. 659 (1999).
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which in some ways are analogous to the principles invoked in the south of the United
States during the civil rights era. Forty years ago, however, federal courts were invoking
such principles to set aside rules that worked against African Americans. Now it is the
Canadians who charge discrimination by state courts, and in an ironic role reversal the
federal government has become the champion of states’ rights.
Concerns expressed by opponents of NAFTA also overlap many misgivings
raised in the so-called “globalization” debate, which has attracted so much attention by
protests at international trade meetings from Seattle to Genoa. Not all observers today
accept Riccardo’s theory of comparative advantage, or share the assumption that crossborder trade and investment (the circulatory system of globalization) bring the world a
net benefit. In particular such criticism is likely to be made by groups that in former
times might have endorsed either socialism or the “New International Economic
Order.” 142 Such opposition was partly responsible for collapse of the OECD-sponsored
Multilateral Agreement on Investment. 143
Members of the U.S. Congress commend trading partners who accept
international arbitration as a potential tool to address foreign trade violations. 144 Yet
when the U.S. is on the receiving end of a request for arbitration, protests are heard about
142

See discussion of Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, in Park, Legal
Issues in the Third World’s Economic Development, supra.
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See Edward Graham, National Treatment of Foreign Investment: Exceptions and
Conditions, 31 Cornell Int’l L. J. 599 (1998). In France, opposition to globalization
under the slogan “L’AMI c’est l’ennemi” (“MAI is the enemy”) built on the double
entendre of AMI (the French acronym for MAI as well as the word for friend).
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See 134 Cong. Rec. 26930-32. Senator Jesse Helms (arch-opponent of restrictions
on American power) urged the United States to withhold economic aid from Costa Rica
until it agreed to arbitrate an expropriation dispute with an American citizen named
J. Royal Parker. See also, 146 Cong. Rec. H3031, concerning Turkey’s agreement to
arbitrate investment disputes with foreigners.
50

“American laws being overridden” by NAFTA tribunals. 145 American legislators warn
against “sacrificing state and local laws at the altar of ill-defined international investor
rights” 146 and suggest that under NAFTA “the rights of an investor come before the rights
to enact a chemical ban to prevent cancer.” 147
B. Playing by the Same Rules
Opposition to NAFTA by special interest groups within the United States has
resulted in a retreat from the traditional level of American governmental support for
binding arbitration as a means to protect foreign investment. This policy shift is highly
problematic, and ultimately will cause significant harm to American interests abroad.
Arguments that a federal government is not responsible for acts of state
authorities toward foreigners (as in the context of Methanex, Loewen and Mondev) are
not convincing. The United States has long presumed that foreign governments must
repair damage caused by political subdivisions.148 Indeed, the complaints by the
American investor in Metalclad arose from actions by a Mexican municipality, and in
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See 145 Cong. Rec. at H-7368. Statement by Rep. Shows (Mississippi) concerning
amendment of HR 2670.
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Id., Statement by Rep. Tierney (Massachusetts).
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Id., Statement of Rep. Bonior (Michigan). In the same debate Rep. Ros-Lehtinen
(Florida) asked rhetorically, “Are my colleagues to allow families’ health and that of our
children, our friends and neighbors to be threatened because of foreign bureaucrats?” Id.
at H-7370.
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See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (5th Edition) at 451, n. 107,
giving examples of arbitrations in which federal states have been held responsible for acts
of their constituent units, including the Youmans Claim (1926, RIAA IV at 110, the
Mallen Claim (1927, RIAA IV at 173) and the Pellat Claim (1929, RIAA V at 534).
51

Calmark from actions before a Mexican state court. 149] . Within the United States itself,
notions of federal responsibility for local misdeeds have a long history. 150
With delicate irony, a foreign claimant in at least one NAFTA case against the
United States has noted the inconsistency between current American attitudes toward
investment protection and longstanding efforts by the United States to promote “full
protection and security” for the foreign assets of its nationals. In Loewen, the United
States advocated narrower interpretations of the concept of governmental “measure” and
more restrictive rules concerning “denial of justice” and exhaustion of local remedies
rules. The Canadian investor’s Reply Memorial pointed out that as far back as 1818 the
United States, in a pronouncement of Secretary of State (later President) John Quincy
Adams had declare that “no principle of the law of nations [is] more firmly established
than that which entitles the property of strangers within the jurisdiction of a country in
friendship with our own to the protection of its sovereign by all the efforts in his
power.” 151
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See discussion supra.
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In support of the so-called alienage jurisdiction of federal courts (covering disputes
between aliens and American citizens), Alexander Hamilton argued that the “peace of the
whole ought not to be left at the disposal of a part.” Hamilton asserted, “The Union will
undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its members.” See
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison & John Jay, The Federalist Papers (No. 18, at 476,
C. Rossiter ed. 1961), quoted in Gary Born, International Civil Litigation in United States
Courts (Third Ed. 1996) at 11.
151

Letter to Mr. de Onis, Spanish Minister (1818), reprinted in John Basset Moore,
4 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Section 535. See generally Loewen Group &
Raymond L. Loewen v. Unitd States of America, Joint Reply of Claimant, 8 June 2001,
at paragraphs 305-08 (available at www.naftaclaims.com) noting numerous
pronouncements by the United States in the context of claims against Brazil, Mexico,
Colombia, Iran and Zair emphasizing the affirmative obligation of the host state to ensure
“full protection and security” to the property of American nationals.
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Cynics might say that one should not be surprised at double standards. Selective
application of procedural standards, however, can have profoundly disconcerting
consequences for wealth creation and economic cooperation. American legal principles
tend to be exported. Thus the United States should take special pains to project the
qualities of fair play and evenhandedness that promote undistorted participation in the
global marketplace. In today’s heterogeneous world, cross-border investment will be
chilled without a willingness of all countries to accept arbitration. Sauce for the goose
ought to be sauce for the gander as well. 152 Promotion of procedural inequality can only
backfire to injure the long-term commercial interests of investor states.
As a practical matter, the nature of anti-NAFTA rhetoric often captures popular
sentiment more easily than the sound arguments against distortion of cross-border capital
flows. The lobby that invokes “pure air and water” and “sovereignty” has a message with
a more urgent ring than the theme of international economic cooperation, notwithstanding
the unfortunate aggregate consequences that flow from measures that discourage
transnational wealth creation.
C. The Free Trade Commission Notes of Interpretation
Initially the NAFTA countries had expected that the ebb and flow of arbitral
wisdom would create a body of case law providing sound investment protection.
However, NAFTA also included a safety valve that permitted member countries to
interpret Chapter 11 through the Free Trade Commission.153
152

The French would say, one cannot have two sets of weights and measures: On ne peux
pas faire deux poids et deux mesures.
153

Article 1131(2) states, “An interpretation by the [Free Trade] Commission of a
provision of this Agreement shall be binding on a Tribunal established under [Chapter 11
Section B].”
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During the summer of 2001, however, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission
issued Notes of Interpretation related to several matters currently sub judice in
Chapter 11 cases. Under the Notes of Interpretation, the requirements of NAFTA Article
1105 were restated to indicate that a breach of another NAFTA provision or a separate
international agreement will not in itself establish that “fair and equitable treatment” has
been denied. 154 Moreover, the Notes of Interpretation limit the meaning of international
law to “customary” minimum standards, 155 thus preventing recourse to other sources of
international law that might either impose or relax restrictions on host State treatment of
foreign investors. 156
To some, these Notes of Interpretation constitute de facto modification of
NAFTA that departs from the original meaning of Chapter 11, and thus require approval
pursuant to Article 2202 in accordance with “applicable legal procedures of each Party.”
154

See NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11
Provisions, 31 July 2001, Part B, reprinted in 13 World Trade & Arbitration Materials
139 (December 2001). In addition, the Notes of Interpretation address the criticism that
Chapter 11 arbitration is not “transparent.” Under the heading “Access to Documents”
the Notes provide that “Nothing in the NAFTA imposes a general duty of confidentiality
on the disputing parties to a Chapter Eleven arbitration.” In this context, it is worth
noting that for decades before NAFTA, expropriation claims against developing countries
had been arbitrated in confidential proceedings under ICSID, UNCITRAL and ICC Rules
without complaint from the industrialized investor nations.
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The Free Trade Commission stated inter alia that Article 1105 “prescribes the
customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum
standard of treatment to be afforded to investments of investors of another Party” and that
neither “fair and equitable treatment” nor “full protection and security” require
“treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary international
law minimum standard of treatment of aliens.”
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For example, a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (reached in the future within
the OECD or the WTO) might refine concepts such as “regulatory taking” in a way
different from customary international law. Or a WTO standards agreement might also
become an issue. However, while such a standards agreement might constitute
international law, it is unlikely that it would relate to investor protection in the context of
NAFTA.
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One award has suggested that Notes of Interpretation which fail to respect the text of
NAFTA would not be binding on arbitrators deciding Chapter 11 disputes. 157
To date no satisfactory way has been found to resolve the potential conflict
between the requirements for amendment under Article 2202 and the provisions of
Article 1131 that permit Free Trade Commission interpretations. If the requirement of
proper approval for amendments is to make any sense, some limits must exist on the
power of the Commission to change the meaning of the established text.
The conflict does not yield to easy analysis. 158 On the one hand, arbitrator
disregard of Commission interpretations could result in different results by different
tribunals, thus reducing the consistency and efficiency of investment arbitration. On the
other hand, the Commission’s de facto amendment of NAFTA would imperil the stability
and predictability of the investor protection regime so laboriously negotiated in 1994.
Conclusion
Until recently, the world of investment arbitration knew fairly clear lines between
host and investor states. Nations such as Libya and Mexico were the respondent host
states; while the United States and Canada were the countries of the investor claimants.
Today, however, the United States and Canada under NAFTA have tasted the flavor of
157

See Final Award in Pope & Talbot, 31 May 2001 (ordering Canada to pay $461,556
plus interest in damages). At footnote 37 (paragraph 47) the Award states, “[W]ere the
Tribunal required to make a determination whether the [NAFTA Free Trade]
Commission’s action is an interpretation or an amendment, it would choose the latter.”
The Tribunal continued, however, that such a determination was “not required” and thus
its analysis “proceeded on the basis that the Commission’s action was an
‘interpretation.’” Tribunal composed of Lord Dervaird, Presiding Arbitrator, Hon.
Benjamin J. Greenberg and Mr. Murray J. Belman.
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Presumably attempts to address potential conflicts would require recourse to the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, art. 31, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
39/27, entered into force 27 Jan. 1980, 63 AJIL 875 (1969), 81 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
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being respondent host states in investment arbitrations, with the concomitant negative
side-effects for economic self-governance.
Traditionally the United States promoted arbitration on behalf of American
investors abroad. However, NAFTA Chapter 11 has now made the country the object of
attack in unwanted arbitrations brought by Canada. One consequence has been that
media, environmentalists, politicians and consumer advocates have called into question
whether investment arbitration is compatible with sovereignty. More significantly,
discontent with the NAFTA has led to provisions in the Trade Act of 2002 aimed at
restricting the type of arbitration provisions normally included in investment treaties.
As with any dispute resolution system, some elements of NAFTA investment
arbitration may be open to improvement. Clarification and adjustment may be in order.
However, it would be fundamentally unsound to call into question the use of
neutral binding arbitration itself as the preferred means for resolving cross-border
investment disputes. Overly general critiques of investment arbitration risk doing more
harm than good, in the end backfiring to injure both the long and short term national
interests. Assertions of “sovereignty” may end up being slippery and unhelpful
abstractions, 159 serving simply as a justification for the exercise of unfettered government
power. 160

159

Taken from the Latin super meaning “above,” sovereignty reflects a power said to be
above others, a formulation used in various languages: au dessus des autres, die höchste
Staatsgewalt or por encima de los demás. Historians sometimes talk of “Westphalian”
sovereignty, derived from the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia ending the Thirty Years’ War in
a way that granted substantial autonomy to local princes. Other uses of sovereignty
include reference to autonomy of political subdivision on certain matters and recognition
of one state by another. See generally W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human
Rights in Contemporary International Law, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 239 (G. Fox and B. Roth eds., 2000) (exploring sovereignty of
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On occasion, the enhancement of national welfare through treaties facilitating
economic cooperation will mean that domestic law must yield to international obligation.
And at times arbitrators interpreting treaty provisions may render decisions with which
national officials or special interest groups may disagree. Indeed, it would be quite
startling if such were not the case, since treaties and arbitration by their nature
supplement national legislative and adjudicatory jurisdiction. However, an occasional
“wrong” decision is a small price for promoting aggregate gain to the public good
through the type of broad cross-border investment fostered by arbitration, particularly
during much of the last half century under the New York and Washington
Conventions. 161

populations in contrast to that of rulers); Stephen D. Krasner, Globalization and
Sovereignty, in STATES AND SOVEREIGNTY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (D. Smith, D.
Solinger, & S. Topik eds.,1999).
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One scholar has referred to sovereignty as “the unique character of governments.”
See W. Michael Reisman, International Arbitration and Sovereignty, 18 ARB. INT. 231, at
237 (2002), adapted from 12th Annual Workshop of Institute for Transnational
Arbitration, 21 June 2001, Dallas, Texas. Professor Reisman writes, “[A]s students of
international law learn early in their pupillage, the fundamental problems of law and
society are usually insoluble and the most and the best one can expect are short-term
experiments in solutions and accommodations, whose durability depends on many
unpredictably variable factors. The unique character of governments is one of those
predictably unpredictable variables.”
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See generally, Jagdish Bhagwati & T.N. Srinivasan, Trade and Poverty in the Poor
Countries, 92 AM. ECONOMIC REV. 183 (2002); Patricia Auger & Michael Gasiorek,
Welfare Implications of Trade Liberalization between the Southern Mediterranean and
the EU, University of Sussex at Brighton, Discussion Paper No. 80, at 22 (2001)
(www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/economics/dp/dp.htm); Jagdish Bhagwati, Economic Freedom:
Prosperity and Social Progress, 1999, delivered to the Conference on Economic Freedom
and Development in Tokyo, at. 6-7 (www.columbia.edu/~jb38/papers.htm); Nicholas
Stern, Globalization and Poverty, The World Bank (delivered to Institute of Economic
and Social Research, Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia) at 9-10 (2000)
(http://www1.worldbank.org/economicpolicy/globalization/documents/GlobalizationIndonesia%20Speech.pdf.); CAMPBELL R. MCCONNELL AND STANLEY L. BRUE,
ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS AND POLICIES (13th ed, 1996) at743; Paul A.
Samuelson, The Gains from International Trade Once Again, 72 ECONOMIC JOURNAL
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If investment arbitration is to fulfill its promise, however, some mechanism must
be found to promote greater sensitivity to vital host state interest. Otherwise investorgovernment arbitration may fall prey to public pressure arising from a backlash against
investor victories in some of the more visible NAFTA arbitrations. 162 In the larger
picture, the ebb and flow of arbitration’s wisdom may have to accommodate political
reality.
As in other areas where law and policy interact, the devil is in the detail. It is less
than self-evident what exactly should be done to reduce the prospect of harsh legislative

(1962) reprinted in JAGDISH BHAGWATI, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 181-82 (1969); JAGDISH
BHAGWATI AND T.N. SRINIVASAN, LECTURES ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE 160 (1983);
MAX J. WASSERMAN, CHARLES W. HULTMAN & RAY M. WARE, MODERN
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 382 (1971); Konrad von Moltke, An International
Investment Regime? Issues of Sustainability (IISD 2000) (reviewing the debate over the
centrality of investment to the development process); Press Release, 9 October 1996,
WTO Report: Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, by Richard Blackhurst, Director of
Economic Research and Analysis Division, and Adrian Otten, Director of Intellectual
Property and Investment Division. www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres96_e/pr057_e.htm,
(examining the interaction of trade and foreign direct investment); Robert E. Lipsey,
Interpreting Developed Countries’ Foreign Direct Investment, working paper 7810,
National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2000 (contesting the view that foreign
direct investment is a major influence on capital formation, and suggesting that the
primary role of foreign direct investment is to transfer assets and production from less
efficient to more efficient owners and managers); Kala Krishna, Ataman Ozyildirim and
Norman R. Swanson, Trade, Investment and Growth: Nexus, Analysis, and Prognosis,
working paper 6861, National Bureau of Economic Research, December 1998
(examining patterns of causation between income, export, import, and investment growth
for developing countries); Robert E. Lipsey, The Role of Foreign Direct Investment in
International Capital Flows, working paper 7094, National Bureau of Economic
Research, April 1999 (examining volatility and dependability of direct investment
flows).
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See Michael Goldhaber, Czech Mate, in AMERICAN LAWYER 82 (MARCH 2002). While
generally positive about investment arbitration (indicating how an American investor was
able to vindicate an expropriation claim against the Czech Republic), the article quotes
David Rivkin of the New York firm Debevoise & Plimpton as warning of a hostile
reaction should the Canadian investor win in the Loewen arbitration, discussed supra.
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responses to NAFTA arbitration. 163 Caution must remain a significant part of the process
for bringing order to the resolution of investment disputes.
Governmental Notes of Interpretation of the type issued in the summer of 2001 by
the three NAFTA member countries, may end up helping to promote reconciliation of the
arbitral process and public interest. However, for the Free Trade Commission to engage
in de facto amendment of NAFTA would imperil the stability of investor protection, and
in some instances might provoke arbitrator disregard of Commission interpretations. 164
In all events, solutions that rely on government screening of an arbitration’s substantive
legal merits risk doing significant damage to the fabric of cross-border economic
cooperation and wealth creation. 165
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For one recent comment on the role of arbitration in cross-border investment, see
Charles H. Brower, II, Structure, Legitimacy and NAFTA’s Investment Chapter, supra,
urging arbitration that would be subject to “review by a standing appellate tribunal, and
supervised by an accountable, transparent, and publicly accessible Free Trade
Commission….” Id. at 93-94.
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See footnote 37 of Final Award in Pope & Talbot (at para. 47) discussed supra. The
process for amendment of NAFTA requires approval in accordance with “applicable
legal procedures of each Party.” See NAFTA Article 2202.
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See discussion supra of H.R. 3005 and H.R. 3009.
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Appendix: Survey of NAFTA Cases

Cases against Canada
1. Crompton
Corporation

6
$100,000,000
November
2001.

The investor filed an amendment to
the Notice of Intent on 19 September
2002.

Articles
Establishment of legal
1102, 1105, restrictions to the use of a
1106 and
chemical product for sowing.
1110.

2. Ethyl Corporation

14 April
1997

$251,000,000

In July 1998 the Parties settled the
case.
Canada paid Ethyl US$13 million.
Canada withdrew the applicable
prohibition to the international and
provincial commerce of the MMT
gasoline additive.

Articles
A statute banning imports of the
1102, 1106, gasoline additive MMT.
1110

3. Ketcham
Investments
Inc. & Tysa
Investments
Inc.

22
December
2000

$30,000,000

According to public information this
arbitration was withdrew.

Articles.
1102, 1103,
1105, 1106
and 1110

Measures related with the
establishment of export fees
under the U.S.-Canada Softwood
Lumber Agreement.

4. Pope & Talbot, Inc.

24
December
1998

$507,552,400

Interim award issued 26 June 2000. Articles
Implementation of the U.S.The Tribunal found no breach of
1102, 1105, Canada Softwood Lumber
NAFTA articles 1102, 1110 or 1106. 1106, 1110. Agreement violates NAFTA.
Award on the merits issued 10 April
2001. The Tribunal found that
Canada had breached NAFTA article
1105.
Award on damages issued 21 April
2002. The Tribunal ordered Canada
to pay USD$461,566.

5. S.D. Myers

21 July
1998

$20,000,000

Award on costs issued 26 November
2002. The Tribunal ordered Canada
to pay USD$120,200 plus interests.
Interim award on the merits issued
Articles
Ban on the export of
13 November 2000. The Tribunal
1102, 1105, polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB)
found that there was a breach of
1106, 1110. waste.
NAFTA articles 1102 and 1105.
Interim award on damages issued 21
October 2002. The Tribunal ordered
Canada to pay CND$6,050,000.
Final Award on costs issued on 30
December 30. The Tribunal ordered
Canada to pay CND$350,000 (costs)
and CND$500,000 (legal fees).
Canada is seeking to set aside the
award.

6. Signa, S.A.*

Not
available

Not available

Not available.
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Not
available

Not available

7. Sun Belt Inc.

27
$10,500,000,000 Submission to Arbitration file 12
November
October 1999.
1998
According to the available
information this arbitration was
abandoned.

7
$32,000,000
December
2001
9. United Parcel Services 19 January $160,000,000
2000
8. Trammel Crow
Company

The Parties settled this matter.

On 22 November 2002, the Tribunal
issued an Award on Jurisdiction
dismissing claims under NAFTA
articles 1105, 1502 and 1503. The
Tribunal also rejected Canada's
jurisdictional challenge to the article
1102 claim and joined two other
jurisdictional challenges to the
merits.

Articles
Suspension of a license on the
1102, 1105, export of water by British
1110, 1118 Columbia.

Article 1105 Canada Post Corporation denied
access to an open and transparent
bidding process.
Articles
Anti-competitive practices by
1102, 1105, Canada Post in a non1502 and
monopolized market.
1503.

Cases against México
1. Adams et al

11
$75,000,000
November
2000

Submission to Arbitration filed on 16 Article
February 2002.
1102, 1105
and 1110.

2. Calmark Comercial
Development Inc.

11 January $400,000,000
2002

Not available.

Articles
1105, 1109
and 1110.

3. Corn Products

Not
available

Not available

Not
available

Not available
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Expropriation and discriminatory
measures taken by the
Government and the Supreme
Court with respect to a property
in Ensenada.
Denial of justice by the courts in
connection with a Joint Venture
Agreement for a development in
Cabo San Lucas.
Not available

30
$50,000,000
November
2000* *

Submission to Arbitration filed 30
October 2001.

12
February
2002
1 October
2001

$1,500,000

Submission to Arbitration filed 5
August 2002.

$55,016,808

Submission to Arbitration filed 9
April 2002.

7. Halchette
Corporation
8. International
Thunderbird Gaming
Corporation

Not
available
2002

Not available

Not available.

Not available

Not available.

9. Karpa (Feldman)

April 1999 $50,000,000

4. Fireman’s Fund

5. Frank

6. GAMI Investments
Inc.

Submission from Mexico on
jurisdiction filed 21 October 2002.

Interim award issued 6 December
2000 (jurisdiction).
Award on the merits issued 16
December 2002, finding Mexico in
breach of NAFTA article 1102 and
ordering payment of
Mx$9,464,672.50 plus interest
(Mx$7,496,428.47).

*

Amended Notice of Intent.
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Articles
1102, 1105,
1110 and
1405.

Government action allegedly
favoring acquisition of peso
denominated debentures owned
by Mexican nationals over dollar
denominated debentures owned
by Fireman’s Fund.

Articles
1102, 1105
and 1110.
Articles
1102, 1105
and 1110.

Expropriation of beachfront
property in Baja, California in
August 1999.

Not
available.
Articles
1102, 1103,
1105 and
1110.
Articles
1102,1105
and 1110

Not available.

Discriminatory and arbitrary
regulation of the sugar industry.
Expropriation on 3 September
2001 of sugar mills.

Gambling licensing. Closure of
the investor’s gaming facilities.

Taxation measures.

10. Metalclad
Corporation

October
1996

$90,000,000

Award on the merits issued 2
September 2000 finding Mexico in
breach of NAFTA articles 1105 and
1110 and ordering payment of
US$16,000,000.

Articles
1105 and
1110.

State action denying a permit to
open and operate a hazardous
waste facility in La Pedrera, San
Luis Potosi.

Award partially confirmed by court
in Vancouver (2 May 2001).

Not available

Supplemental reason for decision (31
October 2000).
Not available
Not
available

11. Promotora
Internacional Santa Fe

Not
available

12. Robert Azinian
(Desona)

24
$17,000,000
November
1996

Final award in favor of the Mexican
government (1 November 1999).

Articles
1105 and
1110

13. Waste Management
(I)
(Acaverde)

February
1998

Articles
1105, 1110

Payment under a concession for
public waste management
services in Acapulco.

14. Waste Management
(II)
(Acaverde)

27
$60,000,000
September
2000

Award on jurisdiction issued on 2
June 2000. The Tribunal found that
the investor had not filed a proper
waiver under NAFTA article 1121.
Award in favor of jurisdiction issued
on 26 June 2002.

Articles
1105, 1110

Payment under a concession for
public waste management
services in Acapulco.

$60,000,000

Cases against the U.S.
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Denial of construction permits
for a development in Santa Fe,
Mexico City.
Termination by a municipal
authority of a concession to
operate a landfill and waste
management system in
Naucalpan.

1. ADF Group Inc.

February
2000

$90,000,000

Submission to Arbitration filed 19
July 2000.
Award issued on 9 January 2003.
The Tribunal found in favor of the
U.S. on the merits.

Articles
1102, 1103,
1105 and
1106.

The Federal Surface
Transportation Assistance Act of
1982 and the Department of
Transportation's implementing
regulations requiring that
federally-funded state highway
projects use only domestically
produced steel.

2. Canfor Corp.

5
$250,000,000
November
2001

Submission to Arbitration filed 9
July 2002.

Article
1102, 1103,
1105 and
1110.

U.S. antidumping, countervailing
duty and material injury
determinations with respect to
imports of softwood lumber

3. Doman Industries
Ltd.

1 May
2002

Not available.

U.S. antidumping and quota
allocation determinations
(softwood lumber).

4. Kenex Ltd.

14 January $20,000,000
2002

Submission to Arbitration filed 2
August 2002.

Articles
1102, 1103,
1104, 1105,
1110.
Articles
1102, 1103,
1105 and
1104.

5. Methanex
Corporation

2 July
1999

Partial award on admissibility and
jurisdiction issued 7 August 2002.

Articles
1102, 1105
and 1110.

California ban on the use or sale
in California of the gasoline
additive MTBE.

$513,000,000

$970,000,000

Reformulated claim filed 5
November 2002.
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The Drug Enforcement
Administration's interpretation of
the Controlled Substances Act as
prohibiting the sale of products
that cause THC
tetrahydrocamaninal (THC) to
enter the human body.

6. Mondev International 6 May
1999
Limited

$50,000,000

Submission to Arbitration filed 1
September 1999.

Articles
1105 and
1110

Decision by the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts and
Massachusetts state law.

Award on the merits finding for the
U.S. issued 11 October 2002.
7. R. Loewen and
Loewen Corporation

29 July
1998

$725,000,000

Interim award on jurisdiction issued
5 January 2001.

Articles
1102, 1105
and 1110

A Canadian corporation seeks
damages for alleged injuries
arising out of litigation in which
the company was involved in
Mississippi state courts.

8. Tembec Corp.

4 May
2002

Not available

Not available.

Not
available

Not available

66

